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Foreword 
The studies synthesized in this paper were conducted as part of the ISS-Hivos Knowledge 
Programme on Civil Society Building. The basic tenet of the Knowledge Programme is an 
intensification of links between practitioners and academics to stimulate dialogue and 
debate. In countries of Sub-Saharan Africa, the overarching theme for our research was 
“Civic action for a responsive government”, focusing on the relatively new role of civic 
organisations to lobby and demand their governments for democratic rights and a fair 
distribution of resources and services.  
Academics and activists were invited to conduct studies of their own interest, within the 
framework of the three basic questions for the Knowledge Programme on CSB: i) what are 
the dynamics of civil society formation and the role of local actors, ii) how do external 
actors contribute to this process, and iii) how has civil society building contributed to 
structural changes in unequal power distribution in society. The researchers were students 
in development studies at ISS who, for their MA thesis researched a particular case in their 
own country (Banda 2007, Andama 2009, Mungai 2009) or in a country of their interest 
(Engel 2006). All studies deal with the political role played by civic organisations and seek 
to better understand what happens when ‘civics go governance’1. By bringing together the 
findings of the studies, this paper analyses the lobby and advocacy work of four civil 
society organisations in Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda and Zambia.  
 
About the author 
Ria Brouwers is senior lecturer International Development Policy at the Institute of  
Social Studies, where she combines teaching and research with external assignments for 
governmental and non-governmental agencies. In the latter capacity she evaluated many 
development interventions and policies, mainly in South Asia and East and Southern 
Africa. The practical experiences are beneficial for teaching of ISS MA students in evalua-
tion of development policy and programmes. Thematic specialisations are international 
development policy, gender equality, research in development, and organisation building. 
Ria has coordinated the Knowledge Programme’s research activities in Sub-Saharan Africa, 
on ‘Civic action for a responsive government’. 
                                                 
1 In the title ‘civics’ is understood in the semantic meaning of Webster’s Dictionary as relating to 
citizens or citizenship; ‘governance’ is understood as playing the role of government. See note 26 
for a more formal definition of governance.  
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INTRODUCTION 
‘Good governance’ and ‘citizen participation’ conquered the international development 
debate at the end of the twentieth century. After a period of cautious references to politics 
in developing countries the international aid community started to openly blame the mal-
functioning of political systems as a major cause of the stagnant process of development in 
the global South. An improvement in the performance of governments, combined with an 
involvement of citizens in decision making were to offer solutions to the widespread policy 
failures. 
Two publications boosted the ideas. The first one was the Dollar report in 19982, which 
asserted that there is a direct link between good governance and economic development. 
The second was the Comprehensive Development Framework (CDF) presented in early 
1999 by World Bank president James Wolfensohn, who proposed a set of new principles 
for international aid: i) ownership of the development agenda by countries in the South,  
ii) partnership between governments, donors, civil society, and the private sector and  
iii) citizen participation.3 Principles like these have set the scene for international 
development in the next decade. 
Explosive growth of NGOs 
One of the aspects of the scene, and the focus of this paper, is what Rick James (2002)  
has called “a seismic shift in the perceived role of civil society”, what David Sogge (2004) 
termed as a “meteoric career” for civil society and Julie Hearn (2007) gave the label of 
“magic bullet”, the “panacea to failed top-down development”. Non-governmental organi-
sations have become ever more involved in aid programs funded by official donors, as the 
preferred channel for service delivery to the poor in many countries around the world.4 
Instead of governments, NGOs became responsible for a large part of health and 
education services.5  
The hausse in NGO formation has been analyzed, reflected upon and criticized ever since 
it started. I draw upon the wealth of writings to sketch how the process took place. Clearly, 
external factors were decisive for the mushrooming of non-state actors in the developing 
South; the NGO-sector itself grasped the openings offered by the global dynamics, result-
ing in an unprecedented expansion in number of NGOs and in claims about the blessings 
of the efforts of non-state actors. The first chapter deals with the history of the NGO-
boom and with the critiques and doubts about the expectations and aspirations of civic 
organisations. They provide the setting against which the four studies about the advocacy 
and lobby work of civic organisations will be analyzed. Chapter 2 addresses the question if 
non-state actors figuring in the four case studies have been able to play an effective 
                                                 
2 Dollar et al. (1998) 
3 The Comprehensive Development Framework (CDF), initiated early 1999 by the World Bank 
president Wolfensohn, has provided the conceptual underpinning of the (Poverty Reduction 
Strategy Papers (PRSP), launched 8 months later, the Millennium Development Goals (adopted by 
world leaders in 2000) and the Monterrey Consensus (2002) 
4 In 2001 fiscal year, civil society participation in World Bank projects in Africa was registered for 
more than one half of the projects approved (Chaplowe & Bamela Engo-Tega 2007: 258). 
5 Riddell (2007: 259) states that in 2004 they ran more projects and programs than official aid agen-
cies, the total value of NGO aid-funded activities in that year reported to be almost $ 24 billion. 
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governance role. The final chapter is for conclusions and ideas about future knowledge 
development and policy.  
But before all that, I continue this introduction with a discussion of the terms ‘Non-
Governmental Organisation’ and ‘civil society’, and in between make a brief historical link 
between the two. 
Defining non-governmental organisations 
The term Non-Governmental Organisation (NGO) covers many different organisations, 
big and small, formal and informal, local, national and international. The organisations may 
bring together people of different categories, like in women’s or youth organisations. They 
may promote different interests, like in consumers’ and patients’ organisation, or in work-
ers’ organisations and trade unions. They may coordinate people of various professions as 
teachers, nurses and doctors, or be established around issues such as faith, peace, eman-
cipation, and environment. Organisations with a purely political or economic purpose, 
political parties and corporations, are usually not labelled as an NGO. When engaged in 
development work NGOs may also be called NGDOs: Non-Governmental Development 
Organisations. Sarah Michael gives a practical definition of NGOs in the development 
sector: NGOs are “independent development actors existing apart from governments and 
corporations, operating on a non-profit basis with an emphasis on voluntarism and pursu-
ing a mandate of providing development services, undertaking communal development 
work or advocating on development issues.” (2004:3) 
From missionary work to NGOs to civil society 
One track of the history of the work of NGOs in development begins when missionaries 
set up schools and health centres as part of their efforts to spread Christianity. While this 
happened since the start of the colonial period in the 17th century, the growth and matura-
tion of the catholic and protestant mission took place in the 19th century. Both changed 
character in the 20th century. On the protestant side, the ecumenical movement with its 
starting point in the World Mission Conference in Edinburgh in 19106, and the self-
consciousness of the newly established churches led to radical changes in ownership and 
orientation of the work, with the Southern Churches taking on more direct responsibility. 
On the catholic side, the traditional focus of church workers on the human fulfilment in 
afterlife, underwent a modernist change after the Second Vatican Council from 1962-1965. 
The subsequent Papal Encyclical of 1967 called Populorum Progressio (On the Progress of the 
Peoples), put the people and the here and now centre stage. The radical nature of the 
Second Vatican Council shifted the approach of the missionaries towards the secular and, 
as Hinfelaar argues, this can be seen as the start of “the trend of ngo-ization or the 
transition from a Christian to a secular eschatology”. (Hinfelaar 2010).7 
                                                 
6 The ecumenical movement was caused by a desire for more unity between churches and mission-
ary agencies worldwide and led to the establishment of the World Missionary Council, which was 
integrated into the World Council of Churches in 1961. 
7 Manji & O’Coill (2002) present the work of NGOs as a continuity of the work of missionaries 
and voluntary organisations active during the colonial period.  
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The other track of the history of development organisations starts with the evolution of 
local organisations before and during the colonial period. Michael (2004) refers to secret 
societies, early movements for independence and hometown community development as-
sociations which came up with the growing urbanisation at the beginning of the twentieth 
century. The organisations performed social and welfare work, they connected with the 
church and missionary organisations. Seeking little power for themselves, these NGOs 
conducted their service-oriented work largely unhindered by the government. “This al-
lowed many local NGOs and civil society organisations to play significant roles in national 
independence movements” (Michael 2004:9). Yet, as Michael continues to explain, in the 
post-independence period the rise of African socialism in much of the continent concen-
trated power in the hands of the state, societal organisations were never very influential. 
She speaks of “the encroachment of a strong and often bloated centralized government 
into civil society, and the resultant weakening and marginalization of civil society“ (Michael 
2004:10).  
Defining civil society organisations 
Since the early 1990s NGOs have become categorized as part of what is termed ‘civil soci-
ety’. Riddell provides the following definition: “At its most general level, civil society refers 
to all people, activities, relationships, and formal and informal groups that are not part of 
the process of government” (Riddell 2007:260). It is a “slippery concept” as he continues 
to explain, for which there is no definitional agreement. “However, broadly speaking civil 
society is understood as the arena (-) in which people come together (-) to promote their 
shared interests, either alone or through interaction with others. NGOs are part of the wi-
der civil society.” (ibid, 362) Hearn considers the categorization of NGOs under the rubric 
of civil society as part of the broadening and politicization of the sector. NGOs were no 
longer gap fillers in the area of social welfare, but important members of civil society.  
“The focus on civil society shifted attention away from international NGOs to national 
NGOs.” (Hearn 2004:1101)  
As the definition indicates, NGOs for development work are part of a country’s civil 
society. In this paper, the acronyms NGO and CSO are used indifferently, referring to 
non-state actors active in the field of development. The term NGO will always be used in 
case of an international non-state actor. 
1 PEAKING NGOS 
How the NGO-formation began in the 1960s was memorized above, but why did NGOs 
break out in such big numbers that the 1980s were labelled the ‘decade of the NGOs’? 
(Hearn 2007:1095, Bebbington et al. 2007). A brief outline of the past may be useful to 
understand the case studies in their historical context. Ironically, global economic and 
political developments far beyond the NGOs’ orbit, triggered their growth and popularity: 
the debt crisis and the structural development programmes, the collapse of the Soviet 
Union ending the Cold War, and the spread of the neo-liberal philosophy. Calls for a more 
effective conduct of development aid further increased the number of NGOs and led to a 
diversification of their roles. 
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Global factors promoting NGOs 
The international debt crisis 
Throughout the 1960s and 1970s, foreign aid and development lending had brought huge 
sums of money to countries in the South. Governments were receiving or borrowing large 
amounts to invest in their economies or to spend on prestigious projects. The commodity 
boom in the West had generated plenty of money, making the banks eager to give credits, 
and the borrowing parties equally keen to get access to financial means for the promotion 
of their interests. A large part of the money came from commercial banks, often set out 
against floating interest rates. Everybody seemed to benefit, the sky being the limit.  
Then came the oil crises, first in 1973 and again in 1979, which fundamentally upset the 
system. Rising prices, followed by a tighter monetary policy plus jumping interest rates,  
and a lower demand for the export products from developing countries, raised the debts 
far beyond the carrying capacity of many.8 The events led to the debt crisis and brought  
the international financial world in disarray. Would debtor countries be allowed to default 
their loans, global financial stability would be threatened, it might even lead to a collapse  
of international financial structures. IMF and World Bank stepped in with drastic measures 
to restructure the debts so that debtor countries would repay and the international system 
would be saved.9 Developing nations had to provide for Structural Adjustment Pro-
grammes to get their economy in order, SAPs which included macro-economic measures, 
ranging from trade liberalisation to drastic cuts in government spending through reduced 
government services. Less government money for education, health and sanitation, housing 
and other provisions created a gap in services, for NGOs to fill. An opportunity they were 
taking in large numbers. 
Fowler has characterized the growing activities of NGOs in Africa as a renewed ‘scramble 
for Africa’. He compared the competition among Western NGOs for development activi-
ties in African countries with the run at the end of the 19th century by European powers  
for colonization of the continent, culminating in the cutting up of Africa at the Berlin 
Conference in 1884. (1991:1, op cit Hearn 2004:1100). Fowler observed two groups of 
‘scrambling’ actors: the non-governmental development organisations looking for African 
partners, and the official aid agencies searching for NGDOs to implement projects they 
wanted to finance.  
Initially Western NGOs undertook the relief and development activities throughout the 
global South, but they were gradually replaced or paralleled by national NGOs, a dynamic 
process of ever changing roles and relationships. The dramatic growth of NGOs in Africa 
can be illustrated by some examples: in 1990 Tanzania had 41 registered NGOs, in 2000 
the counter stood at 10.000. (Rueben 2002, op cit. Hearn 2007). According to the records 
                                                 
8 In 1982 Mexico informed its creditors that it was no longer able to repay the debts it had built up 
over the preceding decades. It was the first but not the only country making its problems known, 
many neighbouring states soon issued similar announcements and in Africa eleven countries were 
unable to meet their debt obligations (Angola, Cameroon, Congo, Ivory Coast, Gabon, The 
Gambia, Mozambique, Niger, Nigeria, Tanzania and Zambia). 
9 Note the similarity with measures taken in the aftermath of the 2008 international financial crisis, 
with the international community putting large sums of money in the banking system and in coun-
tries at the verge of collapsing, in order to rescue the international financial system. 
Synthesis Paper  
When ‘civics’ go ‘governance’ 9 
of the Registrar of Societies 2004, Zambia had 11.096 CSOs, 13.924 religious organisations 
and 41 trade unions.(Saasa & Simutanyi 2007:22) 
The collapse of the Soviet Union, democratisation and free markets  
Another catalyst for the expansion of NGOs was the change in the international config-
uration after 1989 when the Soviet bloc collapsed and the Cold War ended. It opened the 
door for Western countries to pursue an all-out effort to promote their democratic and 
market system. The demise of the Soviet influence in developing countries also levelled the 
barriers for Western governments to stop protecting regimes in the South long known to 
be dictatorial and corrupt. In his book on the history of fifty years of independence in 
Africa, Martin Meredith writes: “Western governments no longer had strategic interests in 
propping up repressive regimes merely because they were friendly to the West. Along with 
the World Bank they concluded that one party regimes lacking popular participation con-
stituted a serious hindrance to economic development and placed new emphasis on the 
need for democratic reform.” (Meredith 2005:387) Criticism that had not been politically 
correct until then, became openly voiced. This public loss of faith in governments in the 
South, was accompanied by a search by international donors for other avenues to channel 
their development money. NGOs were believed to be closer to the people than the major-
ity of the governments and thus better in understanding the needs, and able to combat 
corruption and inefficiency.  
At the time, the ideas of neo-liberalism gained firm ground around the world, favouring  
a more limited role of the state. Free-market ideology among Western governments and 
international financial institutions entered former public domains such as the energy and 
health sector. Soon, the privatisation wave also hit the development sector. NGO’s seemed 
perfectly placed to step into the service gaps left by the governments10, be it as a result of 
austerity measures under the SAPs or in the name of neo-liberalism.  
Changing aid architecture 
In hindsight, the growth in NGOs in the 1980s was only the beginning. Along with the 
changes in the international political economy and the more open debates about the hand-
ling of aid money in developing countries, bilateral and multilateral donors developed a 
new discourse on aid complementing it with a new aid architecture. Ownership, good gov-
ernance, pro-poor policy and participation became key terms in the 21st century aid lang-
uage, essentially meaning that governments in the South were to i) take their own respon-
sibility for the spending of aid, ii) handle the money in a more proper manner with priority 
to fighting poverty and iii) operate internally in a more democratic manner involving their 
citizens in the process of needs assessment and decision-making. The flows of aid were 
channelled differently, project support fell out of favour and aid money was to go directly 
to policy sectors (education, health, energy, etc.) or to the overall state budget. Aid was to 
become a more integrated part of state programmes and it was to be more effectively dealt 
with.  
                                                 
10 Evelina Dagnino (2008) has described how this worked out within one particular country, Brazil, 
where civil society participation became part of the neo-liberal project, to supply state and market 
with information on social demands, as well as to implement public policy for the satisfaction of 
these demands. In the process, the perception on civil society narrowed down to those organiza-
tions that were able to perform these functions in a for the government satisfactory way. 
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In spite of the new frameworks and the progressive language most donors were not confi-
dent about the government’s performance and called upon NGOs to carry out projects 
within the aided sectors, e.g. implementing parts of the government’s social programmes in 
housing, health, etc., running education programmes in schools or promoting the participa-
tion of parents through parent-teacher-associations. In parallel, donors requested govern-
ments to interact with the people on public policy and implementation of programmes. 
The principles of citizens’ participation, laid down in the 1999 Comprehensive Develop-
ment Framework and the Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers, were reiterated in new inter-
national agreements like the Millennium Development Goals adopted by world leaders in 
2000, the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness of 2005 and its successor the Accra Agen-
da for Action of 2008. Leaders from North and South acknowledged the need for collabo-
ration between governments of developing states and its civil society in a spirit of national 
ownership of development.11  
High hopes and aspirations, the discussions within the NGO sector 
While the changing world order created new spaces for non-governmental organisations 
and the confidence of bilateral and multilateral donors boosted their numbers, internal 
dynamics propelled the sector in the same direction of growth and changing roles.  
A shift of views about the causes of poverty had added new dimensions to the work of 
NGOs. Since the 1970s it was widely recognized that poverty is caused and perpetuated by 
structures, institutions, and policies that hinder the development of the poor. Many NGOs 
took the position that a lasting solution to poverty requires changes in such structures. 
Poor people were not to be served with charity and hand-outs, they should be supported to 
demand for better services and to deal with the malpractices they suffer from. In addition 
to the traditional focus on service delivery through projects, NGOs initiated two new sets 
of activities. The first is advocacy, lobbying and campaigning, in an effort to address the causes of 
poverty and deprivation, through activities that give power and voice to the poor. The 
second concerns reviewing and monitoring the activities of other agents of development to make sure 
that the poor have access to affordable and good quality services, or more in general, that 
pro-poor policy is realized, through monitoring of Poverty Reduction Strategies, budget 
tracking, and policy dialogue. (Riddell (2007:261-264)  
Hivos policy on the new role for NGOs 
Hivos introduced the new perspectives on the role of NGOs in its policy document 
“Access to power” in 1988. It called into question the performance of the state and the 
bureaucratic government structures for improving the lives of the poor. The document 
noted that state forms were imported by the West, these “accumulate power and wealth in 
the hands of a small elite at the cost of the majority of the population”. In the Hivos 
                                                 
11 In the Paris Declaration it is agreed that developing countries commit to “take the lead in co-
ordinating aid at all levels in conjuncture with other development resources in dialogue with donors 
and encouraging the participation of civil society and the private sector” (Paris Declaration on Aid 
Effectiveness paragraph 14) Three years later, the Accra Agenda for Action not only re-affirms this 
intention but participants commit themselves to accelerate progress (paragraph 8). The AAA con-
tains a special paragraph on deepening the engagement with civil society organisations. CSOs are 
called “independent actors in their own right whose efforts complement those of governments and 
the private sector. We [signatories] share an interest in ensuring that CSO contributions reach their 
full potential”. (paragraph 20).  
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philosophy, the core problem of the marginalized is their lack of access to power. The poor 
were to be supported to organize themselves, and civic organisations were expected to play 
a crucial role in the democratic development of society.12 Hivos became a front runner 
among donor NGOs propagating civil society building as a new strategy in the process of 
development. Advocacy, lobbying and campaigning were seen as major roles for civic or-
ganisations, to address the causes of poverty and deprivation and to give voice to the poor 
as part of a long-term process of poverty eradication. Awareness raising, empowerment, 
and strengthening the capacity of poor communities became catch-words of the new 
strategy.  
With its 1988 policy document, Hivos was well ahead of the bilateral and multilateral 
donors, whose views about ineffective governments and the need for more citizens’ 
involvement emerged later in the 1990s. The doubts among the donors about a proper 
performance of national governments went hand in hand with a growing confidence in 
civil society organisations. In the ‘good governance’ agenda the views and interests of 
NGOs and international donors came together.  
Self-confidence among NGOs 
With so many opportunities to diversify activities, to grow in numbers and to adopt new 
roles, and with so much money available from various sides, the NGO sector got wings, its 
self-confidence increased tremendously. For long, NGOs had been praised for their ability 
to reach the poor better than governments, to be closer to the people, to give voice to the 
marginalized, but towards the end of the 20th century civil society organisations also came 
to be seen as champions of democracy, watchdogs for corrupt governments, and a coun-
tervailing power of the state, believed to be more representative of the population than 
their government.  
Out of this grew a universal assumption about the work of non-governmental and civil 
society organisations worldwide. Innovative, alternative and able to fundamentally change 
political and economic systems, became the NGO label. “NGOs are only NGOs in any 
politically meaningful sense of the term if they are offering alternatives to dominant mod-
els, practices and ideas about development.” (Bebbington, Hickey and Mitlin 2007).13 Over 
the years, the idea of NGOs being an alternative has been cherished carefully by the sector 
itself. Addressing the causes of poverty through advocacy work and institutional develop-
ment became popular in the non-governmental development sector as the most cost 
effective and least costly form of scaling up (Edwards 2008:39). 
Notwithstanding the preference for advocacy, until today, the bulk of the work of devel-
opment NGOs is to help poor communities with schools, clinics, houses, water and sani-
tation facilities, and income generating work. It is not uncommon for NGOs to be the 
main providers of social services.14 Because of their size and strategic position the larger 
organisations are usually an influential force in their country, others may use part of their 
                                                 
12 Frans Bieckmann & Ellen Lammers 2008: 124, 125. 
13 With this sentence Bebbington et al. (2007) state the conviction underlying their book Can 
NGOs make a difference? The challenge of development alternatives.  
14 In Bangladesh the health and nutrition programme of one single NGO reaches out to over 30 
million people (Michael 2004: 7), and in Ghana or Kenya over 40% of the country’s health care is 
in the hands of NGOs, often faith-based NGOs (Riddell 2007, Michael 2004).  
THE POWER OF CIVIL SOCIETY  
12 Ria Brouwers 
money to lobby their government for a more structural approach to poverty (Namara 
2009:50). The majority of the NGOs though, are addressing day-to-day problems and 
helping the needy in the classical way.  
Cracks in the belief 
The high expectations and aspirations surrounding the new strategic roles of NGOs have 
not gone unquestioned. There are fundamental doubts about the approach by the interna-
tional aid organisations to civil society in the global South on the basis of a concept that 
had emerged historically and contextually in the West. There are doubts about the prospect 
and claims of people’s participation in development. Questions also arose about the logic 
of collective action for the poor, the legitimacy of organisations to speak and act on behalf 
of the poor and their ability to do this effectively. (Mamdani 1996, Van Rooy 1998, Chabal 
& Daloz 1999, Maina 1998, Sogge 2004, Lund 2006, Biekart & Fowler 2008, Namara 2009, 
De Wit & Berner 2009, Berenschot 2010)). Underneath, I will zoom in on the critiques 
about the assumptions regarding civil society in the global South, assumptions which have 
formed the basis of many programmes for civil society building.  
Civil society versus the state? 
In the development sector, civil society is frequently portrayed in opposition to the official 
public authorities, which is largely based on the history of the discourse on civil society in 
Europe since the 18th century. By the year 2000, civil society in Europe had been construct-
ed in contrast to the state, the law, nature, morality, capitalism and socialism (Van Rooy 
1998:11). This construction was strongly influenced by Antonio Gramsci (1891-1937), 
Italian philosopher and politician, who argued that culture was a key factors in the political 
struggle. The capitalist system, according to Gramsci, was dominant not only through 
economic, political and military superiority, but through a cultural hegemony that promotes 
certain social patterns. He stressed that to win the revolution the proletariat had to obtain 
civil, intellectual and moral leadership. Gramsci’s ideas about hegemony triggered the per-
ception of civil society as the antidote to the state, embraced by the non-governmental 
development organisations at the end of the 20th century. In that frame, civil society and 
the state are frequently “pinned at opposite ends of the good guy and the bad guy spect-
rum” (ibid:24) and the promotion of civil society has come to mean limiting the sphere of 
influence of the state.  
On a less radical note, but in a similar vein is the construction of civil society by bilateral 
donors and international organisations like the World Bank and the UN agencies. They also 
perceive civil society as a counterpart to the state, a countervailing power necessary for a 
balanced and correct government, for good governance. The liberal western understanding 
of civil society is of a set of organisations in which citizens conduct voluntary activities and 
debate in public spheres in an orderly fashion and an overall harmonious way, as the con-
science of the state and to keep government on track (Howell & Pearce 2002, Frederiksen, 
2010). The civil society concept in the minds of the donors, including the NGOs, differs 
from the broad definition discussed in the beginning of this paper. It has strong normative 
traits and carries the expectation that CSOs are i) opposite to and separate from the state, 
ii) a harmonious and homogenous set of actors calling the state to duty, iii) providing alter-
natives for failing state performance, and iv) an unselfish group of citizens who prioritize 
the public good. 
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For Van Rooy and many others the good guy-bad guy construction is a misconception, not 
supported by any previous literature on civil society, and more a product of the western 
(especially American) loss of faith in the state. This anti-statism has put the door wide open 
for a special role for civil society, because it implies that democracy will be impossible with-
out the countervailing powers.15 For Van Rooy the big interest of the development sector 
in civil society is “in large part because it is placed as the antithesis to the state” (ibid). This 
is also the view of Wachira Maina after researching Civil Society Organisations in Kenya. 
He argues that donors do not support civic organisations because they believe in their 
potential as such. “Rather, donor support for civil society was meant to confront the state 
(-) giving them money and resources so that they could lobby for positive change and 
check its more egregious excesses.” (Maina in Van Rooy 1998: 156) For him the theoretical 
jump from “the state is not viable” to “civil society is the key to Africa’s success” is invalid. 
Civil society has arisen historically and relationally (ibid). 
… an ideological export item from the West 
A major criticism on the perceived dichotomy between state and society has come from 
Chabal & Daloz (1999) who repudiated the unquestioning use of a concept with Western 
roots and biases for the African situation, where state and society are not separated like in 
Western countries. “The state in Sub-Saharan Africa has not been institutionalized – in that 
it has not become structurally different from society” (ibid: 2). The political realm in Africa, 
they say, is more of an informal, personalized nature, structured in a patrimonial model 
where personal relations matter most. African societies are organised along vertical lines  
of families and ethnic groups. The vertical division is more significant than a horizontal 
division with functional ties of solidarity between people who are similarly employed or 
professionally linked. This makes the development of associations that defend the common 
good in the public sphere highly problematic in Africa. There is no dichotomy between 
state and society, there is no institutional separation between a well-organized civil society 
and a relatively autonomous bureaucratic state. The state never emancipated from society. 
“The current assumption about the emergence of (-) a recognizable civil society in Africa is 
thus eminently misleading and derives more from wishful thinking or ideological bias than 
from a careful analysis of present conditions” (ibid: 18).  
Equally critical is Lund (2006) who finds the notion of civil society to be “the finest ideo-
logical export item that the West can offer the rest of the world, in particular in the light of 
the disillusionment with a centralized state.” (Lund 2006:677) For Lund the state-society 
distinction is one of the great dichotomies of Western thought. In the popular political 
discourse the civil society concept encompasses a “group of institutions characterized by 
their movement in and out of a capacity to exercise public authority. They operate in the 
twilight between state and society, between public and private” (Lund 2006:678) 
The message conveyed by the critiques is that the international aid community has project-
ed roles and strategies on Southern civil society organisations, which may be unrealistic, 
modelled after an ideal, with insufficient attention for the indigenous, vernacular associative 
                                                 
15 In her book, Van Rooy singles out the Dutch aid programme as being premised on just that 
notion: “… for a pluralist and civic society, the development of intermediaries between the citizen 
and State is of great importance. Dutch NGOs operating in developing countries have actively 
supported the strengthening It leads her to the observation that the current interest in civil society 
is “in large part because it is placed as the antithesis to the State” (Van Rooy 1998: 24). 
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life and the prevailing structures of authority, formal and informal. In that perspective, the 
civil society sector in the South suffers from the same “imported from the West” syndrome 
as Hivos in its 1988 policy document ascribed to the state forms, which “accumulate power 
and wealth in the hands of a small elite at the cost of the majority of the population”.  
2 PLAYING THE GOVERNANCE ROLE 
The historical development of NGOs and civil society organisations, the context of their 
new roles and the critical debates on expectations and aspirations, discussed in the previous 
chapters, form the décor for the presentation of the studies in Tanzania, Zambia, Kenya 
and Uganda. All four researched the role of NGOs and civil society organisations, as inter-
mediary between the poor and the government, helping the poor to organize and to raise 
their voice so that the government will better respond to their needs. In this role, civic 
organisations aspire to contribute to development, via a stronger poverty-oriented policy 
and better social services, as well as to democracy through enriched citizenship. The main 
question running through this paper is if and how they are playing this role successfully. 
The analysis of the findings of the four studies concentrates on two assumptions behind 
the governance role: i) the assumptions that citizens organisations build a countervailing 
power and promote democracy, and ii) the expectation that participation by citizens in 
governance matters will trigger social change for the benefit of the poor. For testing the 
first assumption I will primarily make use of the studies about the Policy Forum in Tanza-
nia and Civil Society for Poverty Reduction (CSPR) in Zambia, and secondarily draw on 
findings from the studies in Uganda and Kenya. In the examination of the second assump-
tion it will be the other way around. 
Countervailing power and democracy 
Coalition building for pro-poor policy 
The two networks of civil society organisations researched in Tanzania and Zambia have 
much in common. Both were established in the early 2000’s to make government policy 
more poverty oriented and to bring the people’s views and needs into the Poverty Reduc-
tion Strategy Papers (PRSPs). Both are coalitions of a large number of civil society organ-
isations (50-100), who formed an umbrella to facilitate the dialogue with the national 
government. Initially, the two coalitions were successful, able to include their priorities in 
the Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers with which Tanzania and Zambia became eligible 
for debt cancellation under HIPC, the Highly Indebted Poor Countries Initiative of the 
World Bank and the IMF. From the beginning, however, both were aware of the limited 
agenda for which their input was sought. The long list of ‘non-negotiable conditions’ from 
the IMF on fiscal and economic policies, to which the governments of the two countries 
had to consent to qualify for debt cancellation, were also non-negotiable for civil society, 
giving them a sense of marginalization regarding the real, political issues.  
Both networks also shared a direct donor influence. In CSPR in Zambia, one of the major 
funders, the German bilateral donor GTZ, attended all weekly staff meetings, all meetings 
of the management team and all staff retreats. At the provincial level, GTZ had seconded a 
development worker to help CSPR’s provincial teams (Banda 2007:6). Out of the 94 mem-
ber organisations of the Policy Forum in Tanzania, 17 were international organisations, 
making the dynamics of interaction complex and full of contradictions. Appreciating the 
Synthesis Paper  
When ‘civics’ go ‘governance’ 15 
external resources in terms of money and expertise on the one hand, local organisations 
also felt threatened by their foreign sister who was ‘crowding out’ local work, by ‘knowing 
better’ or by being more recognized because of its resources. The opportunistic attitude of 
the government vis-à-vis the international organisations - sometimes favouring them over 
local NGOs but then restricting their membership as soon as they became too critical of 
the government - made matters even more complex (Engel 2007). 
Countervailing force? 
The donor support has helped civic organisations in their efforts to direct the attention of 
their government towards the needs of the poor, but the strong donor presence raises 
questions about the authenticity of the countervailing force. Whose force is at work here? 
How countervailing is it? A close look at the case studies shows i) the tensions of coalition 
building and representation, ii) the narrow profile of coalition members and iii) the 
cumbersome internal dynamics of the coalition.  
i) Tensions of coalition building and representation 
Many a coalition is built on the assumption that it will make civil society speak with 
one powerful voice, but in practice coalitions often produce watered down com-
promises due to internal conflicts of interest. Not so in the Policy Forum which 
decided to go for diverging, critical voices instead of a weak common denominator. 
Consequently, their choice raised the problem of legitimacy: on whose account does 
the coalition speak. The Forum’s pragmatic position that the quality and credibility of 
the argument and proper ethics of those who voice them are more important than 
representation, may be valid, it also makes any coalition vulnerable for accusations of 
promoting hobby-horses of some members and of advocating for unsupported cases.  
ii) Profile of coalition members 
In order to get the action out into the country and to involve citizens beyond the 
urban areas, CSPR has made serious efforts to decentralize its work to five out of 
nine provinces in Zambia. Through campaigns, local research activities and public 
debates, the CSPR members in the district tried to raise the awareness of common 
men and women about the policy of the government, its budget and expenditures, 
and about the rights of citizens to be informed and involved. The appearance of a 
countervailing force in society got a different meaning upon observing the list of 
actors involved. In the districts of Monze and Mongu there proved to be a tight 
connection between the CSO members of CSPR and the government, with almost 
half of the CSPR activists being teachers in addition to the many members who were 
civil servants working in provincial or district offices (Banda 2007:69).  
iii) Lack of internal cohesion 
Another factor undermining the countervailing character of the coalitions is the lack 
of internal cohesion. Banda reports of power struggles in CSPR with people going 
for personal gains under the guise of the organization, misappropriating CSPR’s 
status, facilities and funds. In this and similar coalitions the cause of the internal 
conflicts lies deeper, the clashes stem from misperceptions about the very goals of 
the coalition. “The larger the membership, the louder the voice” was the slogan in a 
project proposal by the Mwanza Policy Initiative in Tanzania.16 In a short period of 
                                                 
16 MPI Five year strategic plan 2007-2012. 
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time, this provincial coalition, linked to the Policy Forum and set up to ensure a 
proper implementation of the national poverty plan at provincial level, attracted some 
60 CSOs as their members, many engaging in policy matters for the first time. Soon it 
became clear that the new members did not share the assumed impact of the coali-
tions as expressed in the slogan. They joined primarily because they expected that 
being part of the initiative would help them to access external financial resources. 
Such a mis-match of expectations for joining the lobby network is bound to limit the 
chances of a coalition becoming a force vis-à-vis the government.17  
Over the years, the Policy Forum and Civil Society for Poverty Reduction have become 
established partners at the policy table. They have joined the Sector Advisory Groups 
where national policy is prepared, they contribute to the Joint Assistance Strategies de-
signed by donors and government to coordinate aid flows, and they are engaged in govern-
ment initiated meetings to prepare the annual national budget. Their own appreciation of 
their efforts is low as was shown by research among 16 organisations in Zambia active in 
national budgetary work. Fourteen of these rated the impact of their work as weak or ave-
rage, due to lack of power and of capacity among the organisations and lack of openness 
on the part of the government (Muyakwa 2008). 
Citizen organisations supporting the implementation of policy 
What about the CSOs with a direct role in the realization of programmes for the poor,  
like the organisations in Uganda who formed partnerships with the local government, or 
the Kenyan CSOs working on the Constituency Development Fund (CDF)? Have these 
organisations been able to orient government agencies towards the needs of the poor?  
The local government in the Kabarole district in Uganda sought cooperation with two 
NGOs, the international SNV (Netherlands Development Cooperation) and the local 
organisation KRC (Kabarole Research and Resource Centre). The national government 
encourages such partnerships by rewarding a local government with a budget increase of 20 
percent when it successfully cooperates with NGOs, but punishing with a budget cut of an 
equal percentage if it fails to do so. NGOs are expected to complement government efforts 
in providing social services to the local communities, and officials appreciate them for their 
expertise.  
Researching the partnerships, Felix Andama (2009) notes that these are mainly formed 
around the delivery of concrete social services, like the construction of classrooms and 
health facilities, the provision of agricultural inputs, water and sanitation facilities, services 
that are visible for everyone. Cooperation with NGOs that offer less visible matters like 
citizen’s education and participation were found to be in fewer demand among local 
government agencies. Apart from their expertise, the NGOs were also attractive to local 
governments for their capacity to access additional resources, because as Andama found, 
donors would support a project proposal coming from an NGO, but not one written by a 
local government agency. The list of frustrations, which he recorded from both partners, 
confirms that the partnerships are more driven by donors and the national government 
than by the parties concerned. NGOs shared their irritation about the lack of information 
from the government and about being sidelined in the planning process, while government 
                                                 
17 Similar funding tensions were found in other studies of the Knowledge Program as well (see 
Citizens Forum in Zambia, Kabanda 2010). 
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officials complained that the NGO partner was a nuisance, especially its reports about 
cases of corruption created a high level of mistrust on the side of the officials.  
Theoretically speaking, action against corruption could well indicate that the NGOs are 
becoming a countervailing force, acting as promoters of good governance. However, the 
close connection between NGOs and politics makes this doubtful in the case at hand. 
Andama found political leaders seeking support from NGOs for election campaigns, claim-
ing personal credit for the benefits produced by the NGO, or even launching an NGO as a 
platform for their political career. Also contradicting the idea of an emergent countervailing 
force are the close personal relationships between local leaders and NGOs. Thus, the inter-
action between the partners, says Andama, is far beyond the control of the largely illiterate 
community members, in spite of all the words about being responsive to local needs and 
community participation.  
Participation in governance for social change 
The second assumption to test is the likelihood that citizen participation produces social 
change in favour of the poor. The study by Mercy Mungai about the Constituency 
Development Fund in Kenya is a revealing case.  
Through an Act of Parliament the government of Kenya established the Constituency 
Development Fund in 2003. The basic idea of the CDF is that members of parliament 
(MPs) can dispose of funds for community-based development projects in their constitu-
ency.18 Two and a half percent of the total annual revenue collected by the government is 
allocated to the Fund. The Act of 2003 provided various mechanisms for people’s partici-
pation. At local level, a Constituency Development Committee (CDC) is to prioritize the 
projects in accordance with the needs of the community and to oversee their implementa-
tion. The Committee consists of the MP and a group of people from the community. The 
narrative behind the design of the CDF is that projects identified by a representative sec-
tion of the community, will be in accordance with local needs, make use of local knowl-
edge, increase community ownership and make the projects beneficial and sustainable.  
The practice is less ideal. The Fund has been an instrument in the hands of MPs. They 
manipulate the membership of the various committees at constituency and district level 
and exercise power in all decision-making processes. Mungai found that an MP can easily 
use his/her patronage networks to ensure that the projects identified and prioritized are in 
the locations where the MP got most votes, or in locations where the MP hopes to get 
future votes. He/she can nominate his/her favourite members to the CDC, and still be in 
full accordance with the CDF Act. “The unequal power relations between the MP and the 
community appear to have been institutionalized by the CDF Act” (Gikonyo, 2008, quoted 
by Mungai).  
CSOs responsible for organising participation 
In the CDF process civic organisations are invited to inform the communities about the 
Fund, to help them with project proposals, to follow the money and see if it is properly 
                                                 
18 Such funding mechanisms for projects at the level of constituencies have become fashionable 
across the globe. Fifteen years ago, a CDF was established in Zambia, lately countries like Jamaica 
and Tanzania have created a CDF as part of the decentralisation wave. 
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spent. For all this, a system of public notice boards, index cards, training courses and public 
debates has been put in place. While some civic organisations played their role well, there 
were many problems. With so many CSOs conducting awareness raising activities, the 
communities got confused by all the different messages. One local CSO doing this work 
told Mungai that it had not read the CDF Act and relied on what it heard from other 
CSOs. Monitoring the performance of projects and the spending of the money was often 
beyond the capacity of the organisations. They lack technical expertise to determine the 
quality of CDF projects, or research expertise to do proper sampling, data collection and 
analysis, or both.  
Apart from these shortcomings on the side of the CSOs, the power over the whole process 
rests firmly in the hands of the politicians anyway; they can legitimately spend government 
money to serve their political agenda. Instead of promoting social change in favour of the 
poor, the rhetoric of participation serves to cover up political malpractices.  
CSOs participating in policy discussions 
The trap of being used to legitimize decisions was well recognized by the Policy Forum in 
Tanzania. Member organisations often felt ‘being participated’. The presence in govern-
ment-initiated meetings where decisions are taken, means that “you are seen as part of 
those making and supporting the decisions” (Engel 2006). The same uneasiness existed in 
CSPR circles in Zambia. Members showed frustration about being at the mercy of the 
government for timely invitations and information, and about not being taken serious by 
the government. As causes for the lack of effective participation, the two studies suggest a 
combination of factors: i) absence of a legal framework for the work by CSOs and no clear 
outline of the tasks, ii) the tradition of respect for those in power where one is not to ques-
tion authority, iii) the lack of skills in policy and data analysis on the side of the organisa-
tions, iv) the lack of commitment by the organisations resulting in a high level of absent-
eeism at the meetings.  
In all four studies, civic organisations were attracted by the promises of participation. 
Joining the government table was seen as an opportunity to re-direct government plans and 
resources to the poor, but the practice is rather the opposite: participation appears to have 
taken the sting out of the civic organisations. By engaging in the policy work they have 
become part of the system, but without any mandate or real influence. 
Searching for more evidence 
I complement the small sample on which this synthesis builds, with two recent studies on 
the results of citizen action for development and democracy. Both draw on a large number 
of cases and have a certain closeness to our own study. One is about the outcomes of 
citizenship and participation, conducted by a team of researchers at IDS Sussex19, the other 
is about democracy programmes in the Middle East and North Africa, conducted by 
Steven Heydemann for (amongst others) Hivos20. The two studies are testimony that the 
search is on for evidence about the achievements of civil society organisations. Criticism 
                                                 
19 Gaventa and Barrett 2010. 
20 Heydemann (2010). This paper, published as part of the Knowledge Programme Civil Society in 
West Asia, reviews the policy paper by Hivos and the Netherlands Institute for Multiparty Democ-
racy (NIMD) about democracy support in the Middle East and North Africa.  
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regarding the unsupported claims about the benefits of CSOs and of citizen participation, 
to which I have referred earlier, has provoked new research into the outcomes of civil 
society work. Both studies attest the need to reconsider the optimistic allegations of 
benefits. 
Citizen engagement 
The study by the Development Research Centre on Citizenship, Participation and 
Accountability (DRC) at IDS aimed to find out what difference the engagement of citizens 
has made. It covers 100 case studies across twenty countries, collected over a period of ten 
years (Gaventa & Barrett 2010). Citizen engagement was defined in 800 outcomes.21 The 
overall finding of the study is that “citizen participation produced positive effects across 
these outcome types in 75 percent of the outcomes studied in the sample, though in each 
category there are examples of negative outcome as well” (ibid). 
The authors contend that their findings show that citizen engagement can contribute to 
development and state-building, not so much in a one-to-one impact of individual actions 
on changes in policy or poverty levels, but rather through intermediary outcomes. An 
intermediary outcome may be “more aware citizenship, coupled with stronger citizenship 
practices, [which] can help to contribute to building responsive states”. Another key find-
ing is that participation is not always used for benevolent purposes and does not always 
lead to positive results. Twenty five percent of the outcomes were of a negative nature and 
included tokenism, manipulation, a sense of disempowerment, elite capture of participatory 
processes. The third key finding is that negative outcomes are as much due to the behavior 
of the state as to the ability of citizens, while power relations in the newly created participa-
tory spaces reinforced old hierarchies based on gender, caste or race. The message of the 
study is that citizen engagement may lead to indirect positive results for social change, but 
that they may be accompanied by negative effects in no small numbers. The last two key 
findings are quite similar to the issues raised in our studies. 
Democracy promotion 
The second example comes from studies about the Middle East by Steven Heydemann. 
Writing in 2010 on the eve of the revolts in the Arab region, Heydemann found not a 
single case in which democracy promotion has caused or contributed to the breakdown of 
authoritarian regimes, or to a significant change in the distribution of political power. He 
also noted the absence of a single case of a meaningful change in the levels of internal 
democracy within civil society, the capacity of civil societies to serve as carriers of democ-
ratic norms, the efficacy of political opposition, the effective functioning of parliaments, 
(Heyd emann 2010:2). This lack of progress has not led to adjustments in the practice of 
democracy promotion: “…professional promoters of democracy have been remarkably 
unresponsive (-)”, says Heydemann, the resistance to change in the approach of those 
activities running deep among practitioners. The most friendly reason he gives is the ideal-
ism amongst practitioners who expose”a seemingly unshakable faith in civil society as a 
carrier of democracy (-)”. On a more critical note, he mentions their dependence on em-
ployment, and the bureaucratic inertia. Underneath there is the ambivalence of western 
                                                 
21 The 800 outcomes are categorized into four broad areas: i) the construction of citizenship, ii) the 
strengthening of practices of participation, iii) the strengthening of responsive and accountable 
states, and iv) the development of inclusive and cohesive societies. 
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governments, who are more concerned about terrorism, Muslim immigration and political 
Islam than about confronting the authoritarian regimes in the Middle East. 
These observations deserve new attention in the light of recent developments. The un-
expected uprisings in the region since the beginning of 2011 and the collapse of some re-
gimes are still food for analysts, and while the people’s drive for more freedom is obvious, 
the events cannot be credited to democracy promoters. In a recent paper Heydemann 
repeats: “… there is little evidence that US and European democracy promotion efforts 
contributed to the fall of the Egyptian and Tunesian leaders, or to the wave of mass pro-
tests occurring in other countries. The incoherence and fragmentation among the opposi-
tion forces that forced powerful incumbents out of office is a telling indicator of how 
limited the impact has been of decades of efforts to develop the democratic capacity of 
civil societies in the Middle East.” (Heydemann and Leenders 2011:2). Analysing the situa-
tion in Syria and Iran, the authors come to conclusions similar to those of Chaball and 
Daloz in 1999 about Africa, that it is a myth to believe that state and society are neatly 
bounded, as democracy promoters tend to do. They observe that the boundary between 
state and society in Syria and Iran is highly porous, that civil society often reproduce the 
authoritarian norms and practices of the regimes, and come to conclude that “the civil 
society bias evident in current democracy promotion efforts could well be counter-
productive” (ibid:4). 
Besides questioning a number of assumptions prevailing in projects for democracy promo-
tion, Heydemann rejects the assumption that democracy remains the aspiration of the 
people in the region and that grassroots politics are naturally democratic. Upholding the 
need for action to reclaim democracy as a public good, tangible and meaningful for citizens 
in the Middle East, he argues that this will have to go beyond the western style of democ-
racy, which given its current state in the west, including the growing intolerance in Europe 
and the US towards Islam, is not the best example (Heydemann 2010). Others take a 
similar position, like Frans Timmerman, member of the Netherlands Parliament for the 
Socialist Party, who has stated that in spite of all their differences the countries in the 
region share the experience of more than 300 years of supremacy from the West, which 
makes them most reluctant to accept the western ideas about how to run their countries in 
the future, including the ideas about democracy western style.22 
Conclusions 
Testing the assumptions that civic organisations form a countervailing force to the state 
and that citizen participation in governance will trigger social change the case studies have 
shown that:  
 Civic organisations that “go governance” are far from developing a countervailing force 
to government. They are not countervailing, because of the overlapping roles played by 
the people involved – being government officials or politicians and activists at the same 
time. They are not a force, because of the limited internal cohesion and lack of unified 
positions taken.  
                                                 
22 Frans Timmerman in a speech at the symposium “De Arabische Lente”, organized by the 
international secretariat of the Partij van de Arbeid, in cooperation with Evert Vermeer Stichting 
and Alfred Mozer Stichting on April 1 2011. see http://www.viceversaonline.nl.  
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 Participation in policy making in the four countries researched is largely rhetoric, the 
spaces created by the governments are restricted and easily manipulated. Myths and 
tensions about participation discussed in recent literature23, stand out clearly in the case 
studies. Participation is severely limited by the powers above, giving those involved the 
feeling of ‘being participated’. 
 Foreign donors have been very influential in promoting the involvement of civil society 
in governance matters at national and at decentralized level, sometimes in the back-
ground or implicit, but sometimes dominantly present in civil society coalitions. 
 The lack of capacity among civic organisations to play a governance role is largely 
limiting their performance. Although this certainly puts them in limbo, more serious is 
the conclusion that  
 The organisations are operating in a vacuum. The absence of any formal authority or 
mandate, the structural deficiencies in the mechanisms developed for participation, and 
the manipulation by power holders make the efforts of “civics going governance” into 
a mission impossible.  
3 BACK TO THE FUTURE  
The CSB Knowledge Programme has three overall questions for its research activities:  
i) what are the dynamics of civil society formation and the role of local actors, ii) how do 
external actors contribute to this process, and iii) how has civil society building contributed 
to structural changes in unequal power distribution in society. These points are guiding the 
final chapter and are addressed in the first two paragraphs. The last paragraph offers ideas 
for future knowledge development on the force of civil society and its potential for 
changing power structures.  
Dynamics of NGO and civil society formation 
Externally driven NGO-boom 
The explosion of NGOs in the 1990s was largely the result of external factors, global 
economic and political developments ranging from the international debt crisis to the 
collapse of the soviet bloc and the emergence of a worldwide neo-liberalism. It is “one of 
the central contradictions concerning NGO alternatives” say Bebbington et al. that the 
space for them to grow and perform new roles was largely driven by the neo-liberal agenda, 
the very agenda that these organisations have criticized and contested (2007:13). The aid 
effectiveness agenda with items as ownership, partnership and participation has further 
                                                 
23 The myth, for example, of resourceful communities who live in harmony and share common 
interests for which they act in solidarity (Cleaver 1999, Mosse 2004). And the myth that through 
processes of community participation all citizens will have an equal say (Mosse 1994), or that 
change is mainly a result of communication and consensus, rather than of conflict and negotiation 
(Leeuwis, 2000). Cooke and Kothari have even called participation, “the new tyranny” (Cooke and 
Kothari 2001). They reject the naive assumption about the authenticity of motivations and behav-
iour in participatory processes. Instead they observe that power relations prevent the marginalized 
from participating while the very process legitimizes the voices of the most powerful. A recent ISS/ 
Hivos/Oxfam Novib publication with contributions from all over the world offers a critique of 
participation theory and practice, under the title ‘Participation for what: Social change or social 
control?’  
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stimulated the NGO growth and has promoted citizen organisations to the realm of 
governance. 
Brokers, for whom? 
As part of their governance functions, NGOs and CSOs have adopted the role of broker 
between the government and the poor. At least one of the parties, the government, does 
not accept that role and is putting up barriers to prevent the civic organisations to play it 
effectively. There are the practical barriers of late or limited information flows, but there 
are also structural obstacles, like the CDF Act in Kenya that allegedly supports people’s 
participation but in practice favours the sitting powers. New obstacles are raised by the 
NGO bills, which have been passed recently (Zambia 2009) or are in preparation (Kenya, 
Uganda). While restricting the NGO room for manoeuvre, governments in Africa also 
show ability to adapt their own language to “the codes of democracy”, as Heydemann 
(2010) calls it. 
How does the other party, categorized as ‘the poor’ or ‘the people’, appreciate the broker 
role of NGOs? The case studies have not systematically researched that question, but the 
findings show that the trust of citizens in the NGO sector is not big, due to lack of observ-
able results of the advocacy work, and they point out that people prefer the delivery of 
straightforward services like agricultural inputs, classrooms, water and sanitation facilities 
above the less tangible things like civic education and participation.24  
The myth of society organisation 
Within the institutional triangle of state, market and community, the NGO sector has been 
considered as part of the community (Wood, in Hulme & Edwards 1997:89). Views on the 
primacy of these three for the development of a country have shifted over time, as Hulme 
& Edwards have argued. Until the 1970s, the state was seen as the main provider of all the 
people’s needs, but soon ‘the myth of the state’ was replaced by ‘the myth of the market’, 
i.c. that the private sector provided for all consumption needs. By the end of the 1980s a 
new myth emerged, the ‘myth of the market plus civil society’ (Hulme & Edwards 1997: 
276). It created the frame of thinking that caused the NGO-boom.  
Ironically, the more popular the non-governmental development organisations became, 
and the more common the use of the term civil society, the less the civil society organisa-
ions seem to be genuinely part of society. We might call this ‘the myth of CSOs as society’. 
The new governance roles of civil society organisations appears to have moved them away 
from the community and to have resulted in free-floating organisations, not forthcoming 
from nor embedded in or accountable to society.  
Initially, the CSO activism to enhance people’s skills for engagement in policy and politics 
evoked enthusiasm, but lack of tangible changes paralyzed the vibrancy and internal power 
dynamics have taken its toll. In the meantime, the claimed beneficiaries, the poor, have 
                                                 
24 The views of poor people on the role of civil society organisations in their lives were extensively 
documented in 1999 by Narayan et al in the World Bank study Voices of the Poor. The record for 
the NGOs was mixed and the conclusions show remarkable similarity with findings in our studies, 
especially Andama’s study in Uganda. After hearing the voices of the poor the researchers conclud-
ed “… it is unclear whether NGOs are more successful than formal institutions at reaching the 
poorest areas. (-) Relations between NGOs and governments are often marked by tension: truly 
complementary relations between the two are rare” (Narayan et al. 1999: 104).  
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disappeared from the scene. The initiatives were not a product of their demand, they were 
absent at the start, and only drawn in in small numbers to realize the proclaimed participa-
ion. Supply seems to be the driving force, the supply of donor funds.  
Close to donors and to governments 
“Too close for comfort” was the qualification that Hulme and Edwards gave to the rela-
tionship between NGOs and donors, back in 1997 already. The qualification concerns a 
gradual process of co-optation, starting with the acceptance of funds, the application of 
donor language and instruments and culminating into the reproduction of the bureaucratic 
donor culture (ibid: 278). Our studies showed a similar closeness of the organisations to the 
donor community. By directly controlling the organisations (Zambia) or by channelling the 
money to organisations of their own likening (Uganda), donors have a strong influence on 
the working of the system. There is reason to believe that David Sogge is right in his obser-
ation that NGOs may be “local clones” of northern nonprofits. (Sogge 2004:18).  
NGOs and CSOs have also moved close to their own governments. In spite of the com-
plaints from NGOs about being sidelined and mistrusted by the government officials, they 
have become part of the same camp, and are often seen as such by the public. The diag-
nosis made by Chaball & Daloz (1999) about the lack of institutional separation between 
civil society and the state bureaucracy in Africa, was assented in the studies (Banda, 
Andama, Mungai). Other analysts also report about the phenomenon, like Maina who in 
his research of Kenya called the boundaries between the state, political society and civil 
society “rather porous, often blurring into each other” (Maina 1998:135). Saasa & 
Simutanyi also speak of the ‘blurred distinction’ between the public and private sphere in 
Zambia (2007:6, 18), referring to the highly personalized character of the Zambian political 
system, and the absence of ideological or programmatic differences between political 
parties. The situation in the Middle East is no different, as Heydemann and Leenders have 
argued, calling the democracy promoters’ belief in a distinction between state and society a 
‘myth’ (2011:4). 
Side effects of external support 
Money-wise, CSOs have had a comfortable position during the past decade. The case of 
Kabarole in Uganda showed that they were able to access money, while local government 
was not. The situation created uneasy forms of partnership, as citizen organisations were 
crowding out local governments. Similar forms of competition were found in Zambia 
between citizen organisations and political parties and, more fundamental perhaps, between 
CSOs and parliament, the latter having no right to approve the National Development Plan 
(successor to the PRSP), while the Zambian government does discuss it with civil society 
groups (Saasa & Simutanyi 2007: 24). Whatever the reputation of politicians in Africa, it is 
ironical that non-elected, non representative civic organisations have acquired a place at the 
policy table, while formal structures of democracy like local government and political 
parties, have been sidelined.  
Parliaments are usually completely insignificant, as was found by Eberlei (2007). He ob-
served that the opportunities created by the PRS process in Zambia for civil society actors 
to become closely involved in policy matters, fundamentally changed the political environ-
ment (Eberlei, 2007:11). The privileged civil society organisations are not seeking coopera-
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tion with parliament, links between civil society organisations and the elected bodies are 
either weak or absent (Eberlei 2007:12, Saasa & Simutanyi 2007:18).  
This indicates that the preference of foreign donors to support CSOs in a governance role 
has not been conducive for the development of a formal democratic control system, it may 
even have undermined it. After years of project support, one of the lessons was that the 
creation of a parallel administrative system at project level was counterproductive, but the 
current promotion of a system of parallel public governance institutions is even more dis-
ruptive. Speaking with Eberlei: “it is misleading to simply scale-up the ‘participation ladder’ 
from the project level to the national level and to demand joint decision making” (ibid:12).  
Close to donors, close to governments, removed from society and operating in a vacuum. 
The findings raise doubts about the validity of a governance role by free-floating citizen 
organisations. In the end, the civil society building strategy of advocacy to address the 
causes of poverty and to give voice to the poor has put in the saddle organisations that are 
more FOR the people than OF the people. 
Future knowledge development 
Our sample of four cases is small, but in combination with earlier academic writings and 
recent research on citizen engagement and democracy promotion, the findings call for a 
fundamental review of the assumptions underlying the support to civil society develop-
ment. Only few of the organisations figuring in the case studies are Hivos partners, yet the 
findings do matter for Hivos, since the promotion of a governance and advocacy role by 
citizens’ organisations has been a key element in its strategy. Further knowledge develop-
ment could be set out along two major lines, the line of analysing the theory of change on 
which the strategy and the activities are based, and a more practical line of researching the 
functioning of new forms of organizing: networks and coalitions. 
Theory of change 
The theory behind much of the support to civil society activities is that organisation build-
ing and collective action are catalysts for changing power structures. It must be recognized 
though, that many civic actions studied in the Knowledge Programme, which were de-
signed to change the course of government policy, have not been successful in doing so 25. 
This calls for a reflection on the theory of change and its subsequent aid strategies. Eyben 
et al have developed a useful framework of theories on “how history happens”, and its 
interpretations in the non-governmental development sector (Eyben et al, 2008). The 
framework with five common theories of change, including the theory that change is the 
outcome of joint efforts so that organised groups should be nurtured in their actions to 
obtain positive societal change, can serve as a starting point for an analysis of the theory of 
change en vogue among Hivos and its partners.  
Van Stekelenburg and Klandermans (2009) offer another useful framework for analysis. 
They contrast the classical ‘breakdown’ theory of deprivation as reason why people protest, 
with the ‘resource driven’ mobilisation theory, developed to explain the social movement 
                                                 
25 This was noted in countries as far apart as South Africa, Nicaragua and Costa Rica. While the 
mobilisation process may have brought out large numbers of people, the very aims for which the 
people set out to campaign were not attained.  
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activity in western countries since the late 1960s. From a resource mobilisation perspective, 
people’s protest is linked to the availability of resources and the perceived chances of 
success, “rather than from rising or declining grievance levels”. For resource mobilisation 
theorists, poor people will usually not be the first to go out and protest, since “the struggle 
to survive will take up all the time and energy poor people have, and only when daily life 
severely breaks down does protest emerge.“ If this is true as well for the African situation, 
many of the civil society building activities may have been based on a false theory of 
change, notably the grievance theory which assumes that people organize because of their 
subordinated position, lack of opportunities, inequality and marginalisation. An analysis of 
when and why people protest needs to be location and situation specific. Hivos Knowledge 
Program is well-placed to start a series of events with partners to discuss and analyse the 
theory of change in their particular environment, the outcomes of which can inform future 
interaction.  
The review of the theory of change could extend to a reflection on: 
 the very role of organisations for social and political change. Has group formation been 
over-estimated in the aid sector? What are the prospects of collective action in different 
situations and what might be alternatives? (See Namara 2009, De Wit&Berner 2009, 
Berenschot 2010) 
 the future for democracy and institution-building in African countries. If western forms 
of governance are not suitable in the African context, what are alternatives?  
 the kind of organisations that can serve the poor in the particular context in which they 
live, identifying genuine forms of civil society development. It has been said that 
NGOs have hijacked civil society in countries in the South (WRR, quoting Edwards, 
Fowler, Molenaars and Renard, Rose). How can civil society get its own identity and 
integrity back? 
 the need and desirability of external support, both material and immaterial. In many 
cases, external support seems to have been disruptive for genuine civil society building. 
What does that mean for the role of external partners and for financial aid? 
New types of organisation 
Over the past decades new types of organisation have become popular. Especially for per-
forming the governance role civic organisations have joined hands in coalitions, associa-
tions or networks, more or less formalized structures. Bilateral and multilateral donors, as 
well as private grant makers, have embraced networks as new organizing structures. Hivos 
also supports many national and regional networks, which conduct lobby and awareness 
raising activities on various issues ranging from civic education, violence against women, 
HIV/Aids, etc. In view of the problematic character of free-floating organisations encoun-
tered in our studies, which have become detached from the groups they claim to represent 
and/or serve, more knowledge is needed about the functioning of networks or coalitions as 
agents of social change. A recently developed framework by IDRC could be most useful to 
study networks by attending to three broad categories of inquiry: i) the network vibrancy: 
how healthy is the network in terms of participation, leadership, capacity; ii) the network 
connectivity: the nature of relationships within the network and its external reach; and iii) 
the network effectiveness, identifying the extent to which the network realizes the expecta-
tions and is able to make a difference (IDRC 2010). The Hivos Knowledge Programme 
could set out to research the functioning of networks beyond the individual partner evalua-
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tions to enable comparisons and to identify trends in the way networks function, and to 
better understand their viability as social change mechanisms. 
REFERENCES  
Andama, Felix (2009) ‘Friends or Foes? The Local Government - NGO Partnerships in 
Uganda, a case of Kabarole district’, MA thesis. The Hague: Institute of Social Studies. 
Andama, Felix (2011) ‘ “Marriage of convenience” The Local Government – NGO 
Partnerships in Uganda, a case of Kabarole district’, Working Paper Hivos & ISS 
Working Paper Series The Power of Civil Society (forthcoming). 
Banda, Saul (2007) ‘Integrating a Rights-based approach (RBA) in Monitoring Poverty 
reduction Strategies, Lessons from CSPR in Zambia’, , MA thesis. The Hague: Institute 
of Social Studies. 
Bebbington, Anthony, Samuel Hickey & Diana C. Mitlin (2008) Can NGOs Make a Difference, 
The challenge of development alternatives. London: Zed Books Ltd. 
Berenschot, Ward (2010) ‘Everyday Mediation: The Politics of Public Service Delivery in 
Gujarat, India’, in Development and Change 41(5): 883-905. 
Bieckmann, Frans & Ellen Lammers (2008) Hivos! 1968-2008, Een onvoltooide geschiedenis: van hulp 
naar andersglobalism. Amsterdam: Mets & Schilt. 
Braathen, Einar (2006) ‘A Participatory Pathbreaker?Experience with Poverty Reduction 
Strategy Papers from four South African countries’, NIBR Working Paper 2006: 122 
Oslo: Norwegian Institute for Urban and Regional Research. 
Chabal, Patrick & Jean-Pascal Daloz (1999) Africa works, Disorder as political instrument. London: 
The International African Institute in association with James Curry, Oxford; and 
Bloomington: Indiana University Press. 
Chaplowe, Scott G. & Ruth Bamela Engo-Tjega (2007) ‘Civil society organisations and 
Evaluation’, Evaluation 13(2): 257-270. 
Cooke, Bill and Uma Kothari (2001) Participation, the new tyranny. London: Zed Books. 
Dagnino, Evelina (2008) ‘Civic Driven Change and Political Projects’, in Alan Fowler & Kees 
Biekart (eds) Civic Driven Change, Citizen’s Imagination in Action. The Hague: Institute of 
Social Studies. 
Dollar, David & Lent Pritchett (1998) ‘Assessing Aid, What works, what doesn’t and why’, A 
World Bank Policy Research Report. 
Eberlei, Walter (2007) ‘Accountability in Poverty Reduction Strategies, The Role of 
Empowerment and Participation’, Social Development Papers, Participation & Civic 
Engagement, Paper No. 104/May 2007. Duisburg: Institute for Development and Peace 
(INEF), University of Duisburg-Essen for the World Bank. 
Edwards, Michael (2008) ‘Have NGOs made a difference? From Manchester to Birmingham 
with an elephant in the room’, in Bebbington et al., pp. 38-52. 
Engel, Hermine (2006) ‘Seizing and Stretching Participatory Space, Civil Society Engegament in 
Tanzania’s Policy Processes’, MA thesis. The Hague: Institute of Social Studies.  
Engel, Hermine (2010) ‘Seizing and Stretching Participatory Space, Civil Society Engegament in 
Tanzania’s Policy Processes’, Working Paper 1 in Hivos & ISS Working Paper Series The 
Power of Civil Society. 
Eyben Rosalind, Thalia Kidder, Jo Rowlands & Andres Bronstein (2008) ‘Thinking about 
change for development practice: a case study from Oxfam GB’, Development in Practice 
18(2): 201-212. 
Fowler, Alan F. (1998) ‘Authentic NGDO Partnership in the New Policy Agenda for 
International Aid: Dead End or Light Ahead?’, Development and Change 29(1): 137-159. 
Frederiksen, Bodil Folke (2010) ‘Mungiki, Vernacular Organization and Political Society in 
Keny’, Development and Change 41(6): 1065-89. 
Gaventa, John & Gregory Barrett (2010), ‘So What Difference Does it Make? Mapping the 
Outcomes of Citizen Engagement’, Development Research Centre on Citizenship, 
Participation and Accountability (DRC) from the Institute of Development Studies in 
Brighton. http://139.184.195.66/publications/WP347.pdf  
Synthesis Paper  
When ‘civics’ go ‘governance’ 27 
Gomez. Georgina M., Ariane A.Corradi, Pedro Goulart and Rose Namara (eds) (2010) 
Participation for what: Social change or social control? The Hague: ISS/Erasmus University 
Rotterdam; Hivos, Oxfam Novib. 
Gould, Jeremy (2006) ‘Strong Bar, Weak State? Lawyers, Liberalism and State Formation in 
Zambia’, Development and Change 37(4): 921-941. 
Gould, Jeremy (2009) ‘Zambia’s Oasis Forum: A new form of politics?’, in Jan-Bart Gewald, 
Marja Hinfelaar, Giacomo Macola (eds) One Zambia, Many Histories, Towards a History of 
Post-colonial Zambia. Printech Ltd Lusaka.  
Hearn, Julie (2007) ‘African NGOs”: The New Compradores?’, Development and Change 38(6): 
1095-1110. 
Heydeman, Steven (2010) ‘The Uncertain Future of Democracy Promotion: Review of Policy 
paper Beyond Orthodox Approaches: Assessing Opportunities for Democracy Support 
in Middle East and North Africa’, joint publication of Hivos and the Netherlands 
Institute for Multiparty Democracy (NIMD). 
Heydeman, Steven and Reinoud Leenders (2011) ‘Resilient Authoritarianism in the Middle 
East: Lessons from Syria and Iran & Implications for Democracy promotion’, 
Knowledge Programme Civil Society in West Asia, Policy Paper 2, joint publication of 
the University of Amsterdam and Hivos. 
Hinfelaar, Marja (2010) ‘Debates on the secular in Zambia: The Catholic Church response to 
Scientific Socialism and Christian Nation (1976-2006)’, in Harri Englund (ed.) Christianity 
and Public Culture in Africa, pp. 50-66.. Athens, OH: Ohio University Press. 
Hout, Wil (2010) ‘Governance and the Rhetoric of International Development’, Inaugural 
Address. The Hague: Institute of Social Studies of Erasmus University Rotterdam. 
Hulme, David & Michael Edwards (1997) NGOs, States and Donors, Too Close for Comfort? New 
York: St. Martin's Press in association with Save the Children. 
IDRC International Development Research Center (2010) ‘Next Generation Network 
Evaluation’, prepared for IDRC by Innovations for Scaling Impact and Keystone 
Accountability. Accessed 28 april 2011 <http://www.scalingimpact.net/files/IDRC_ 
Network_IPARL_Paper_Final_0.pdf> . 
Larmer, Miles & Alastair Fraser (2007) ‘Of Cabbages and King Cobra: Populist Politics and 
Zambia’s 2006 Election’, African Affairs 106(425): 611-637. 
Lund, Christian (2006) ‘Twilight Institutions: An Introduction’, Development and Change 37(4): 
673-684.  
Manji. F. and C. O’Coill (2002) ‘The Missionary Position, NGOs and Development in Africa’, 
International Affairs 78(3): 567-583.  
Michael. Sarah (2004) Undermining Development: The absence of power among local NGOs in Africa. 
Oxford: James Curry. 
Mosse, David (1994) ‘Authority, Gender and Knowledge: Theoretical Reflections on the 
Practice of Participatory Rural Appraisal’, Development and Change 25(3): 497–526.  
Mosse, David (2003) ‘The making and marketing of participatory evaluation’, in Philip Quarles 
van Ufford & Ananta Kumar Giri (eds) A moral critique of development, in search of global 
responsibilities, pp. 43-75. Routledge London and New York. 
Moyo, Dambisa (2009) Dead Aid, Why aid is not working and how there is a better way for Africa. New 
York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux.  
Mungai, Mercy (2009) ‘Civil Society Organisations’ Role in Enhancing Accountability and 
Community Participation: The Case of the Constituency Development Fund in Kenya’, 
MA thesis. The Hague: Institute of Social Studies. 
Muyakwa, Stephen (2008) ‘Situation analysis and learning needs assessment: participatory 
budget monitoring and resource tracking for health and HIV/AIDS project’, Zambia, 
draft report. 
Namara, Rose (2009) NGOs, Poverty Reduction and Social Exclusion in Uganda. Maastricht: Shaker 
Publishing. 
Narayan, Deepa, Raj Patel, Kai Schafft, Anne Rademacher, Sarah Koch-Schulte & World Bank 
(2000) Can anyone hear us?: Voices of the poor. New York: Oxford University Press.  
THE POWER OF CIVIL SOCIETY  
28 Ria Brouwers 
Ngoma, Alex (2010) ‘Administration and Utilization of Financial Resources in the Public 
Sector: The Case of the Constituency Development Fund in Zambia’, internal paper for 
ISS-Hivos Knowledge Programme Civil Society Building. 
Riddell, Roger (2007) Does Foreign Aid Really Work? Oxford: Oxford University Press.  
Rooy van, Alison (ed.) (1998) Civil society and the aid industry: the politics and promise. London: 
Earthscan. 
Saasa, Oliver S. & Neo Simutanyi (2007) ‘Zambia, Power and Change Analysis, Underlying 
factors explaining governance issues and implications for policy change’, study 
commissioned by Embassy of the Kingdom of The Netherlands, Lusaka. 
Sharky, Katrina and Theodore Dreger (2006) ‘The Role of Legislatures in Poverty reduction, 
Experiences and Future Directions’, WBI Working Papers. Washington, DC: World 
Bank Institute. 
Simanga Sithebe and Hamisi Mwango (n.d.) ‘Five year strategic plan 2007-2012, Hivos’, 
internal Hivos document. Trace (OD Training and Facilitation Centre). 
Sogge, David (2004) ‘Civic Domains in African Settings: Some issues’, A discussion paper for 
the Hivos Africa consultation, 7-9 June 2004, Arusha, Tanzania. 
Stekelenburg, Jacqueline van, & Bert Klandermans (2009) ‘Social movements theory: past, 
present and prospects’, in Stephen Ellis & Ineke van Kessel (eds) Movers and Shakers, 
Social Movements in Africa, pp. 17-43. Leiden: Brill.  
Wetenschappelijke Raad voor het Regeringsbeleid (2010) Minder pretentie, meer ambitie, 
Ontwikkelingshulp die verschil maakt. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press. 
Wit, Joop de & Erhard Berner (2009) ‘Progressive Patronage? Municipalities, NGOs, CBOs 
and the Limits to Slum Dwellers’ Empowerment’, Development and Change 40(5): 927-947. 
Wood, Geof (1997) ‘States Without Citizens: The Problem of the Franchise State’, in Hulme, 
David & Michael Edwards (eds), NGOs, States and Donors, Too Close for Comfort? pp. 79-92. 
New York: Palgrave, in association with Save the Children.  
Synthesis Paper  
When ‘civics’ go ‘governance’ 29 
ANNEX 1: FOUR STUDIES SUMMARIZED 
Introduction  
The following pages give a summary of the four studies on which this synthesis paper 
builds. The cases have been forthcoming in a random way: under the theme of ‘civic action 
for a responsive government’ and guided by the three major research questions of the 
Knowledge Programme on Civil Society Building, ISS students, and researchers and 
activists in various African countries were invited to make a proposal for research. The 
submitted proposals were assessed by the ISS Knowledge Programme team, and presented 
for advice to the Hivos KP team on Southern Africa. Once selected, a process of 
collaboration started between the researchers and ISS staff, in some cases leading to joint 
work during the research, in others to supervision and advice. The studies have been 
conducted between 2006 and 2009, in Tanzania, Zambia, Uganda and Kenya.  
The guiding research questions were: 
 How can we understand the dynamics of civil society formation and the role of local 
actors in this process? 
 How do external actors (donors as well as support organisations) contribute to this 
process? 
 How does civil society building as a process contribute to structural change in the 
unequal balance of power in society? 
The theme ‘civil society for a responsive government’ was chosen in view of the growing 
involvement of a wide range of national actors in policy design and implementation. “In 
many African countries, civil society organisations have been formed or re-organized for 
the purpose of participating in the poverty reduction strategy process, in its formulation 
and in the monitoring of its implementation. Funds for conducting this work have come 
from bilateral, multi-lateral and non-governmental (NGO) donors.” (Research Plan) The 
rationale for the study on civic action for responsive government was to find an answer to 
the questions if and under what circumstance citizens organisations can play a role in policy 
processes, holding their government accountable for poverty reduction. “It [the research] 
will focus on the dynamics and effectiveness of civic actions and it will analyse the 
contribution of external support in the process.” (ibid) 
This umbrella offered space for a variety of studies with a common focus on the relatively 
new role of civic organisations in public policy and politics, a role of advocacy and lobby, 
of monitoring and watch-dogging. Thus, all studies analyse what happens ‘when civics go 
governance’.26  
                                                 
26 Governance “the formation and stewardship of the formal and informal rules that regulate the 
public realm, the arena in which state as well as economic and societal actors interact to make 
decisions” (Wil Hout, 2010, Inaugural address, quoting Hyden, Court and Mease 2004). 
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Civil Society Participation in Tanzania’s Policy Processes, the case of 
Tanzania Policy Forum  
Sources:  
Hermine Engel 2006,’Seizing and Stretching Participatory Space, Civil Society Engegament in 
Tanzania’s Policy Processes’, ISS MA thesis. 
Hermine Engel 2010,’Seizing and Stretching Participatory Space, Civil Society Engegament in 
Tanzania’s Policy Processes’,Working Paper 1 in Hivos & ISS Working Paper Series The 
Power of Civil Society. 
Introduction 
In 1999, Tanzania was considered eligible for debt relief under the HIPC (Highly Indebted 
Poor Countries) initiative of the World Bank and the IMF. To qualify for debt cancellation 
the government had to prepare a Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) together with a 
broad range of stakeholders, including civil society organisations. Stakeholder participation 
was set as a condition by the international institutions to ensure national ownership of the 
policy. Researching civil society’s participation in this process, Engel studied the case of the 
Policy Forum, a coalition of 94 NGOs, research institutions and NGO networks, 
established in 2002.  
Policy Forum 
The Policy Forum has its roots in the need - identified after the first activities around the 
Tanzanian PRSP process - for a more effective civil society approach to policy advocacy. 
Whereas many CSOs had been involved in service delivery, the demand for participation in 
policy processes, which was increasing at rapid pace, required other capabilities. The Policy 
Forum’s key objective was to “[build] on the collective and individual experiences to date 
to create a more systematic approach to policy engagement” (Hakikazi 2002) The Forum 
was well aware that one should make efforts to avoid the “one-off method of participation 
that has come to be expected of civil society by the government and donors” (ibid). Its 
engagement with the PRSP was based on the view that “there is now more room for civil 
society to make a difference than there used to be” (Gould and Ojanen, 2003:7 quoted by 
Engel 2010:5) At the time of Engel’s research in 2006, the PF counted 94 members, 77 
were Tanzanian organisations, 17 were international organisation operating in Tanzania. 
In 2002, the Policy Forum had successfully influenced the country’s PRSP, getting its views 
included in each of the priority sectors addressed in the document. The Forum was equally 
able to influence the subsequent Joint Assistance Strategy designed by donors and govern-
ment to coordinate aid flows. As a network of organisations, the PF jointly engaged in 
meetings initiated by the government on overall policy making, while member organisa-
tions engaged individually on thematic issues of their specific expertise. Engel’s paper pre-
sents the key findings of her research, which explored the strategies of civil society organi-
sations to ensure more meaningful participatory engagement. The five emerging issues 
identified in the study are: co-optation, coordination, representation, international vs. local 
dynamics, and engagement in larger political processes. 
Cooptation 
Engel found that participation is recognized on paper, but not practised. The engagement 
was more of a consultative nature making Civil Society Organisations vulnerable to the 
whims of the inviting party, government and donors. CSOs in the country showed aware-
ness of the danger of joining government-initiated meetings on policy matters, as this 
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involvement easily leads to cooptation, “… decisions are taken in your presence, so you are 
seen as part of those making and supporting the decision.” Engel encountered reports of 
‘being participated’, a form of involvement “to meet the donor conditionality and to keep 
the various stakeholders happy” (p 7). Explanatory factors for this situation were found in 
the historical and cultural context which gives much respect to those in power and where 
by tradition one is not to question authority, and in the lack of skills in policy and data 
analysis on the side of the organisations. 
Houtzager (2003:92) had warned that entering alliances with the state “inevitably surren-
ders some degree of autonomy” – including pressure to affirm decisions already taken.  
This may be particularly the case when civil society has not been effectively prepared for 
the engagement due to limited capacity and lack of sufficient information. Engel noted the 
preferred strategy of the PF for a ‘50/50 participation’, on the one hand taking part upon 
invitation by the government with limited space for own initiatives, and on the other hand 
creating spaces “where civil society can develop its own agenda (-) through advocacy and 
capacity building”. 
Coalition, Coordination and Control  
Coalition building among members of the civil society sector has been considered a key 
element for successful advocacy. It can be looked upon from various perspectives. There is 
the view that a coordinated civil society would be a stronger force to be reckoned with, it 
would send out a stronger message to those in power and it would thus have a greater 
influence on government. From another perspective, government and donors were 
believed to emphasize the importance of coordination because they need a coordinated 
body of organisations to invite to participatory forums. As critics remarked: “A strong 
correlation is seen here between coordination and control”. The most outstanding example 
cited by Engel’s respondents was the establishment in 2005 by the EU of a Non-State 
Actors (NSA) coordinating body to incorporate NGOs, media, trade unions and the 
private sector. This donor and government-driven initiative evoked scepticism among civil 
society actors as its invitation policy was sidelining the more critical PF members who were 
kept out of the task team. (p 9) 
Coalition building is based on the assumption that civil society can and will speak with one 
voice. However, the PF organisations experienced that the scenario of one neat coordinat-
ed package to speak with a single unified voice on policy matters, required too much com-
promise, and was in practice impossible. Several PF members emphasized the undesirabili-
ty of such compromise, preferring diversity and a critical voice above a weak common 
denominator. (p 10) 
Representation 
The arguments for coalition building among CSOs relate to the issue of representation. 
Government and donors favour strong coordination among CSOs to guarantee broad 
representation of citizens and to facilitate the selection of organisations to invite to the 
policy table. The PF realizes though, that for both practical (e.g. time and distance) and 
ideological reasons representation in the true sense is impossible. Instead, as a former PF 
chairperson argued in Engel’s research, “it is more important what you are bringing to the 
table, what research or data (-). What is important is the credibility of the evidence... don’t 
say you are speaking on behalf of this particular constituency, you should be evaluated on 
the strength of your analysis of the issues.” (p 11) The PF preferred this above efforts to 
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secure full consultation to reach consensus, because the results of the latter “may be so 
watered-down to please as many views as possible and to make everyone feel represented”. 
In this view, legitimacy is seen as a product of credibility of the evidence put forward and 
proper ethics of those who claim to be working on behalf of the poor. 
International vs local dynamics 
The strong presence of international organisations was also a key issue found by Engel 
during her research in Tanzania. On this point her article starts by quoting Simbi and 
Thom who wrote in 2000: 
There once was a time when many northern NGOs ran development projects by 
themselves, employing staff in country, or using expatriates to oversee work. A second 
stage emerged when a number of northern NGOs … moved to a “partnership model” 
in which local organizations applied to northern NGOs to carry out development 
projects … Since the mid-1990s, this model has evolved into a third stage in which 
northern NGOs no longer simply provide funds, but must now also be seen to add value 
and build capacity … Implementation by proxy appears to be emerging as the fourth 
stage in this progression … [where] the northern NGO defines the parameters of the 
relationship, assesses the African NGO, and has comprehensive management structures 
in place to ensure compliance” (Simbi and Thom 2000:213-215)  
In Tanzania the first stage is still very much in practice although the other stages seem to 
exist at the same time. At all the stages, the dynamics of interaction with international 
organizations is complex and filled with contradictions. On the one hand, international 
organisations are valued for the resource they bring, in terms of money and expertise, and 
local organisations have welcomed their inputs. On the other hand, they may feel 
threatened by the international sister because it is ‘crowding out’ local work, by ‘knowing 
better’ or by being more recognized because of its resources. The government has shown a 
double face, in some cases favouring the international organisation over the local NGO, in 
another case being opportunistic, by suddenly restricting membership of committees to 
Tanzanian NGOs when the international member was becoming too critical.  
The signals of ‘implementation by proxy’ experienced by the PF led the organisation to 
start looking for funds which would ensure its independence and would also free it from 
the burdensome reporting procedures. Several respondents emphasized the desire that local 
and international NGOs team up, whereby the latter’s role is to strengthen the local 
partners to take responsibility for Tanzania’s development. 
Engaging in big issues vs. micro-ization 
Respondents shared with Engel their concern of being called in to deal with the local issues 
or with issues of minor importance, while being sidelined when larger political issues were 
at stake. Tendler launched the term ‘micro-ization’ for this phenomenon. A major point of 
contention in PF was the lack of effective engagement around the macro-economic 
stabilisation programme. To reach HIPC decision point the government of Tanzania had 
to consent to a funding agreement with the IMF known as the Poverty Reduction Growth 
Facility, which contained “nearly three dozen non-negotiable conditions pertaining to the 
government’s economic and fiscal policies” (Gould 2005:25) These macro-economic policy 
conditionalities form the basis for new lending, so that the PF had wanted to discuss the 
impact of these conditions on the poor. It felt, however, that “the political will of the 
government – also seen as constrained by donor conditionalities - does not leave much 
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room for effective engagement on macro-economic policy and its linkages to the micro 
policy discussions.” (p 15) 
In view of the scarce room for civil society organisations to get involved with the larger 
political issues, the Policy Forum opted for “self-created spaces to influence policy more 
effectively by coming together independently as civil society organisations to determine 
alternative strategies.” These strategies include facilitating public debates, raising awareness 
in communities, conducting policy analyses, working through the media, performing 
independent monitoring of implementation. The PF strongly felt that for engagement at 
the level of larger political processes it had to be more pro-active and to build coalitions 
among civil society groups and citizens.  
Conclusion 
An effective response of civil society organisations to the requests for its engagement in 
policy processes requires ability “to seize and stretch the participatory spaces made 
available by government and to create alternative spaces of engagement to influence policy 
processes.” For networks like the Policy Forum “a continuous critical assessment is 
necessary to ensure that participation is not limited to the level of consultation, but that it is 
re-politicised to affect the necessary structural changes (-).” (p 16) 
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Civil society participation in Zambia’s Policy Processes, the case of 
CSPR Zambia Civil Society for Poverty Reduction  
Sources:  
Saul Banda 2007, Integrating a Rights-based approach (RBA) in Monitoring Poverty reduction 
Strategies, Lessons from CSPR in Zambia, ISS MA thesis 
Braathen, Einar (2006), A Participatory Pathbreaker?Experience with Poverty Reduction Strategy 
Papers from four South African countries, NIBR Working Paper 2006:122 (NIBR = 
Norwegian Institute for Urban and Regional Research) 
CSPR Evaluation report 2008,  
Stephen Muyakwa 2008 ‘Situation analysis and learning needs assessment: participatory budget 
monitoring and resource tracking for health and HIV/AIDS project’, Zambia draft report. 
Introduction 
Around the turn of the century, Zambia like Tanzania, qualified for debt relief under the 
Highly Indebted Poor Countries initiative led by the World Bank and IMF. The condition 
was similar: prepare a Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) together with a broad 
range of stakeholders, including civil society organisations. In Zambia, it led to the forma-
tion of Civil Society for Poverty Reduction (CSPR), a coalition of 50 civil society organisa-
tions. Having worked closely with some of the organisations involved in the coalition, Saul 
Banda, ISS MA student in 2007, researched the engagement of CSPR with the policy 
processes in Zambia. This summary makes use of his findings, as well as of findings of 
related studies about CSPR’s work as policy advocate.  
Civil Society for Poverty Reduction - CSPR  
CSPR was established in 2000, under the auspices of the Jesuit Centre for Theological 
Reflection (JCTR) with the objective to mobilize and coordinate civil society engagement in 
the formulation of the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper. In 2005, CSPR became registered 
as an independent organisation. The work of CSPR was done from various angles and with 
components at central and decentralized level. 
Policy advocacy 
Its initial mission was quite successful, many of CSPR’s comments and ideas were included 
in the draft PRSP of 2001. CSPR was very active in organizing a participatory process, 
involving many people in rural areas. (Braathen 2006) After the PRSP was adopted and put 
into operation by the government, CSPR continued its involvement in national policy fora, 
by monitoring the implementation of the policy and partaking in the formulation of the 
successors of the PRSP, the Fifth National Development Plan (FNDP) and the Sixth 
National Development Plan, which started to be discussed in 2010.  
Participation in the national policy fora was through individual CSPR members, who 
accepted the invitation by the government to join the Sectoral Advisory Groups (SAGs) in 
their specific fields of expertise. SAG’s comprised representatives from the government, 
civil society, academia, private sector and international donors. The early experiences were 
of a mixed nature. In some of the SAGs the participation of CSPR members has been 
successful, but from the beginning it was evident that in the SAG on Macro-economic 
policy the role of representatives of CSPR was reduced to being observers (Banda 2007:57). 
An assessment of the functioning of the SAGs points to the following problems: i) no clear 
terms of reference, ii) lack of commitment from members leading to a high absenteeism, 
iii) absence of a legal frame supporting the work, iv) lack of being taken serious by the 
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government.27 CSPR members showed frustration about the fact that the agenda was 
largely driven by the government and that civil society groups were at the mercy of the 
good will of the government for timely invitations and information.  
With the Sixth National Development Plan (SNDP) now in the making, NGOs have 
become part of the process as members of the SAGs. The action and consultation process 
seems to be less dynamic than it was in the period of the first PRSP in 2001. The situation 
now is that of established NGOs being invited at the table, who know the game and know 
what they want. As the Guidelines of the Ministry of Finance state that every paragraph of 
the Plan has to be endorsed by the SAG, this effectively means that the NGOs agree to the 
Plan once it is officially submitted.  
Budget work 
Every year, CSPR has been doing what is called ‘budget work’, the analysis and monitoring 
of the annual national budget. Together with several other NGOs, CSPR joined the 
government initiated meetings in the preparation of the budget. Its input in this regard was 
well noted among sister organisations who were also involved in the process.28 The work 
included the submission of proposals to the Ministry of Finance and National Planning, 
based on a situation analysis and stakeholder meetings in the districts. In addition, CSPR 
has been organizing annual meetings with Members of Parliament on the government 
budget right after its submission to Parliament. The meetings are meant to discuss issues 
and gaps in the budget, but due to the large majority of the ruling party (MMD) in Parlia-
ment it is virtually impossible for MPs to make any significant changes. CSPR also plays a 
role as a watchdog on government spending. When the Auditor General presents its report 
to the Public Accounts Committee, CSPR makes its own analysis of the account, especially 
reporting about any ‘over-commitments’29 they may encounter. 
Muyakwa (2008) notes that the CSOs active in the budgetary work are not very positive 
about what they were able to achieve. Fourteen out of 16 organisations interviewed in a 
study in 2008 rate the impact of their work as weak or average. Asked for concrete 
examples the respondents mainly stated vague results, like ‘higher priority being paid by 
government to poverty issues’. Most common factors hindering the budget work of CSOs 
were said to be lack of information from the government, lack of capacity and skills in the 
organisations and the inability of Parliament to act upon the input provided by CSO and to 
amend the budget due to their limited powers in this area (Myakwa 2008:33-39). 
Reaching out to the provinces 
In addition to its work at the national level, CSPR aimed to have programmes in five of 
Zambia’s nine provinces with the intention to mobilize local communities to participate in 
poverty reduction initiatives in their local environment “enabling the poor to speak for 
themselves” (Banda 2007: 55). A Provincial Focus Group was being hosted by one of the 
member organisations and a similar construction existed at the district level. The intended 
Area Committees (below district level) have only existed on paper (Banda 2007:48).  
                                                 
27 CSPR report 2005, quoted in Muyakwa, Stephen L. (2008: 28). 
28 Muyakwa (2008) reports that the field study among CSOs on their role in participatory budget 
monitoring and resource tracking, shows that CSPR was most frequently mentioned as participant 
in the budget work. (ibid, p 34). 
29 A euphemism for ‘corruption’. 
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In the early years, activities of consultation and campaigning at provincial level were 
realized, but overall the CSPR structure has been top-heavy. CSPR was mainly located at 
the national secretariat with lack of visibility at provincial and district level, and with a top-
down system of planning and implementation. (Evaluation CSPR 2008:viii) Accordingly, 
the identification of issues at sub-national level was found to involve mainly the members 
of the provincial management team; local communities and district authorities were not 
much part of it. Therefore, “the issues and activities might not be relevant to the needs of 
the local people” (CSPR Eval Report 2008:x) 
Actors in CRSP 
A closer look at the actors involved in CSPR reveals two interesting features. The first is 
the tight connection between CSOs and government on the personal level, due to the large 
involvement of government employees in CSPR and its member organisations. In Monze 
and Mongu almost half of CSPR activists were teachers, in addition to the many members 
who were civil servants working at provincial or district offices (69). The second 
outstanding feature is the strong presence of donors in CSPR. As one of CSPR’s major 
funders, the German GTZ attended all weekly staff meetings, all meetings of the 
Programme Management Team, and the CSPR staff retreats. At the provincial level, GTZ 
had seconded a development worker to help the provincial teams with planning and 
implementing their work (Banda 2007:66)  
Internal struggles 
The organisation was further challenged by internal power struggles, with people going for 
personal gains under the guise of the organisation. Banda notes: “... the board has been 
‘hijacked’ by individuals representing ‘briefcase’ organisations that are of a questionable 
character” (Banda 2007:63). And: “... some Board members have the habit of interfering 
with day-to-day running of the organisation, with unnecessary visits to the Secretariat 
offices (-) in which case they would request transport refunds in addition to using office 
equipment such as computers, telephone and fax.” (ibid p 64). The high staff turn-over has 
put severe strains on CSPR’s ability to perform, leading to heavy reliance on out-sourcing 
of the work. Ironically, “In some cases, those engaged as consultants turn out to be the 
same individual CSPR Board members, raising serious questions about transparency and 
accountability.” (ibid p 64/65)  
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The Local Government–NGO Partnerships in Uganda, a case of 
Kabarole district  
Sources: 
Felix Andama, 2009, “Friends or Foes?” The Local Government–NGO Partnerships in Uganda, 
a case of Kabarole district, ISS MA thesis.  
Felix Andama, September 2010, “A marriage of convenience” The Local Government - NGO 
Partnerships in Uganda, a case of Kabarole district”.  
Introduction 
Pressure to increase the effectiveness and efficiency of public administration incited many 
governments in developing countries to undertake public sector reforms. In Uganda, this 
process led to measures of decentralisation, including the encouragement of partnerships 
between government agencies and non-state actors. Local government and non-govern-
mental organisations in Kabarole district thus started to work together for the development 
of their region. Felix Andama, ISS MA student 2009, has studied their cooperation, investi-
gating the driving forces behind it and the nature of the joint efforts. Taking the cases of 
Kabarole Research and Resource Centre (KRC) and the Netherlands Development Organi-
sation (SNV) he analyses the partnerships. 
Involvement of non-governmental organisations in public service is no novelty in 
Kabarole. It started way back in the 19th century when the missionaries established schools 
and hospitals, thus becoming important service deliverers. As part of the administrative 
decentralisation process in Uganda, at the end of the 20th century, the role of non-state 
actors in public affairs intensified. NGOs like the Kabarole Research and Resource Centre 
(KRC) were formed, along with smaller local organisations active in different sectors.  
Driving forces for partnerships 
Andama identified various factors that motivated local governments and non-governmental 
organisations to work together. The government side seeks cooperation from NGOs,  
because they expect them to complement their own efforts in meeting the demand for 
social services by the local communities As a government official stated: “We look for 
NGOs that fit our development priorities and can fill the gaps.” Governments recognize 
the expertise of NGOs in particular fields. This was especially so in the case of SNV, which 
has technical staff specialized in education, agriculture, human resource management and 
administration and who can offer support in the different sectors of district and local 
governments.  
A major attraction for government officials is that NGOs have the capacity to access 
additional resources. It was said that donors may support a project proposal coming from 
an NGO but not one written by a sub-county or district local government, which only 
receives donor money through central government funds.  
An important motivation for partnership on the side of the NGOs is to help improve the 
quality of service delivery by the government by supporting local government agents on the 
one hand and communities on the other. Apart from technical support, this also includes 
the tackling of corruption where needed.  
NGOs were also found to be interesting partners, because they can help political leaders 
during their election campaigns. People have started NGOs or have used them as a 
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platform to launch their political career. At election time, some politicians have taken credit 
for the work being done by the NGO, e.g. by claiming that thanks to them a particular 
NGO has come to the region.  
Local governments and NGOs both show eagerness to deliver tangible social services to 
communities, like the construction of classrooms and health facilities, the provision of 
agricultural inputs, water and sanitation facilities. Such services are visible for everyone and 
results can be attained in a relatively short period of time. Cooperation with NGOs that 
focus on intangible matters, like community mobilisation and citizen’s education and 
participation, were found to be less in demand among local governments.  
Nature of partnerships 
Partnerships are high on the agenda of the government of Uganda as can be told from the 
measures taken to promote its effectiveness. Each year, an assessment is made of the local 
government’s compliance with the involvement of NGOs and other actors and if found 
inadequate, the local government gets a budget cut of 20% the next year; if the perfor-
mance is good, a 20% increase in funds from the national government is rewarded. 
Co-production and co-governance 
Andama identified two forms of cooperation: co-production and co-governance. Following 
the definition by Joshi and Moore, he defines co-production as “… the provision of social 
services through a regular long term relationship between state agencies and organised 
groups of citizens, where both make substantial resource contributions.” (Joshi and Moore, 
2004) In co-production, service providers may be i) independent, able to substitute each 
other, or ii) interdependent, where a minimum input from both is required for any output 
to be obtained (Mitlin, 2008). SNV works mainly with the district government in capacity 
building. It helps strengthen management structures and systems to improve governance. 
Andama labels this form of cooperation as co-production, since the contribution of each 
party is essential for the end result.  
Co-governance refers to an arrangement in which the non-state actor participates in the 
planning and delivery of public services (Brandsen and Pestoff, 2006). The partnership with 
KRC aims to empower local communities to actively take part in planning and budgeting, 
and it helps the local government structures to respond to the needs in the health and 
education sectors. KRC has developed various monitoring instruments with which the 
community can track the public expenditures. The objectives of the work are to promote 
public sector accountability and to improve systems of service delivery. Andama calls this a 
form of co-governance “because KRC is involved in the promotion of participatory 
planning, budgeting, monitoring of service delivery and promotion of accountability in the 
public sector.” 
Competition and conflict 
The partnerships can be characterized as one of cooperation, but also of competition and 
conflict, which are fed by the following factors: 
 partnerships are often pushed by external actors like the national government and 
international donors, so neither the government nor the NGO acts out of free will; 
 government agents consider NGOs as a nuisance, especially if they are requesting 
accountability of the government and bringing out corruption affairs; 
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 NGOs tend to demonise local government officials, causing mistrust and irritation. 
Critical factors determining effective partnership  
In his research Andama identified factors that may benefit the partnership between local 
government and NGOs, but which are present to a limited extent only. These include: 
Accountability and trust 
Basic factors for effective partnership are information sharing, accountability to each other 
and trust. In Kabarole district, both local governments and NGOs claim to be sharing their 
information, but complain that the other is not. A district official stated that “They are not 
sharing their information, yet they have access to our information. We are suspicious that 
they are hiding some things from us.” A look at the kind of information to be shared 
shows that the district and sub-county local government are interested in information 
about the budget, work plans and reports of activities of the NGOs, which NGOs seem 
reluctant to share. NGOs are interested in the budgets and work plans of the local 
governments to which they feel to have right of access. Reported cases of corruption by 
the NGOs have contributed to a high level of mistrust among the cooperating partners.  
Level of involvement 
Related to information sharing is the level of involvement in each other’s activities and 
programmes. The NGOs claim they do involve the local governments in their activities by 
inviting the local leaders to meetings and sharing plans with them. They feel that the 
government does not take them serious in the actual planning process. “When they bring 
you on board, you find that you have very little input, because they have already planned 
their thing”. On the other hand, the local governments expressed concern over the low 
level of seriousness exhibited by the NGOs, who send persons to attend meetings, like the 
budget conferences, that cannot take decisions on behalf of the NGOs.  
Informal relationships between leaders of the partner organisations 
Informal relations between the leaders of both parties can determine the working relation-
ships between the institutional partners. An NGO official had this observation about how 
the informal relationships affect the way the partners work and perceive each other. “The 
personal relationship our leaders have had a bearing on the kind of relationship we have as 
an institution. You may find a local leader has a bad relationship say with the director of an 
NGO, you find that you as an organisation end up having a bad working relationship with 
that NGO.”  
Work experiences of leaders 
The leader’s previous working experience, either as an NGO official or in local govern-
ment, was found to be of great importance for the ability to negotiate in the complex rela-
tionships between the local governments and NGOs. This working knowledge facilitates 
the process of relation-building, since the leader may be in a position to understand the 
challenges faced by the other partner. The close links usually kept with former colleagues 
promotes the effectiveness of the partnerships. 
NGOs involvement in active local politics 
Involvement of the NGO officials in “active” politics, especially elected political positions, 
seriously affect the partnerships between the local governments and NGOs. A local gov-
ernment official noted that some of these bad relationships are due to leaders of some 
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NGOs, who mix the NGO work with their political agenda. This was confirmed by a 
spokesperson from NGO-side who noted that; “an NGO official stood for an election and 
this led to a lot of conflict between the local government and NGOs in Kabarole district as 
mistrust set in.” 
Some reflections by way of conclusion 
Quoting Mitlin (2008) that co-production and co-governance by state and citizens may be 
used by NGOs as a way to secure political influence, Andama confirms this to be at work 
in the Kabarole case. Politicians take credit for success attained by NGOs and NGO offi-
cials have sailed on the winds of the NGO to promote their personal political ambitions  
Andama links his findings about the centrality of personal links between leaders of local 
government and NGOs to an observation by Lister (1999), that “the dominance of 
personal relationships within the organisational relationships calls into question much of 
the theory currently being developed for NGOs in terms of capacity building, institutional 
strengthening, scaling-up and diffusion of innovation, which all rely on organisational 
processes as the basis for change’ (Lister, 1999:15).  
Community empowerment as supported by the NGOs may lead to people’s awareness 
about their rights to services, and it may enhance their capacity to hold the service 
providers accountable, both state and non-state actors. However, Andama notes that lack 
of power and capacity on the side of the largely illiterate community members make it 
difficult for them to actively participate and to speak out and hold the local government 
and NGOs accountable.  
If decentralisation is to bring services to the people, to make these responsive to local 
needs and to empower communities to participate, the environment has to change before it 
can happen in a serious way. This would require changes in the rules and regulations 
governing the cooperation processes, but it would also require changes in attitudes and 
behaviour of local government as well as non-state partners. Andama concludes that for 
the time being, “practice is far from principles”.  
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Civil society and the Constituency Development Fund in Kenya 
Sources: 
Mercy Mungai (2009) Civil Society Organisations’ Role in Enhancing Accountability and 
Community Participation: The Case of the Constituency Development Fund in Kenya 
 Alex Ngoma (2010) ‘Administration and Utilization of Financial Resources in the Public Sector: 
The Case of the Constituency Development Fund in Zambia’, internal paper for ISS-Hivos 
Knowledge Programme Civil Society Building 
Various newspaper and other articles from Jamaica, Tanzania, Kenya, Uganda.  
Introduction 
Funding mechanisms for projects at the level of constituencies have become fashionable 
across the globe. Fifteen years ago, president Chiluba of Zambia established “a new budget 
format that will provide constituency grants that will fund locally generated project ideas”. 
(GRZ 1995, quoted in Ngoma 2010). In other countries as well, CDFs have been created 
as part of the decentralisation wave, including Jamaica, Tanzania and Kenya. The basic idea 
of a CDF is that members of parliament (MPs) have funds available for development 
projects in their respective constituency, small funds depending on the size of the district, 
its population and the degree of poverty. 
Mercy Mungai, ISS MA student 2009, researched the Constituency Development Fund in 
Kenya. The study presents findings on the CDF mechanism and its implementation. 
Whereas the CDF Act provides for active involvement by citizens and citizens’ organisa-
tions, Mungai’s paper explicitly looks at the space for CSOs in the CDF process to parti-
cipate in a meaningful way. Primary data were collected in three constituencies, Nairobi, 
Machakos and Makueni, where both local and national NGOs are engaged in activities 
around the CDF.  
CDF in Kenya 
The Kenyan government established the Constituency Development Fund through an Act 
of Parliament in 2003. The CDF was to channel financial resources to the constituency 
level for community-based development projects that would improve people’s social and 
economic well being. By bringing resources closer to the people and giving them decision 
making power over its use, the CDF was also to promote the participation of people in 
their own development. The Fund has received 2.5% of the total annual revenue collected 
by the government, 75% is allocated equally among the 210 constituencies, 25% is divided 
on the basis of the poverty index in the constituency. It is estimated that – on average – 
each constituency has received at least 30 million Kenyan shillings annually.30 This being 
tax payers’ money, it could be argued that each and every Kenyan contributes to the CDF 
(Gikonyo, 2008, quoted by Mungai).  
The mechanism of the CDF was designed to ensure participation by common people. At 
local level, a Constituency Development Committee (CDC) is set up to prioritize and 
oversee the implementation of projects in accordance with the communities’ needs. The 
composition of the CDC is determined by law. It should include the elected member of 
parliament, two councillors, two male and two female representatives from the constituen-
cy, two persons representing religious organisations, one youth and one NGO representa-
                                                 
30 IDRC, Projects in Kenya 2006, website accessed 7 September 2010, www.idrc.ca. 
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tive, with a maximum membership of 15 people. The projects prioritized at local level are 
submitted to district committees and finally to a national board. The decision of approval is 
taken by the Constituency Fund Committee (CFC), a national committee that is composed 
of MPs only. The implementation of the projects is through the existing government 
structures at the district level. The narrative around the design of the CDF is that projects 
identified by the representatives of the community would be responsive to local needs, 
make use of local knowledge and values, and thus increase community ownership making 
the projects beneficial and sustainable.  
The practice has been less ideal. The CDF has been an instrument in the hands of MPs. 
They can manipulate the membership of the various committees at constituency and 
district level and exercise power in all decision-making processes. Mungai explains that an 
MP can easily use his patronage networks to ensure that the projects identified and 
prioritized are in the locations where the MP got most votes, or in locations where the MP 
hopes to get future votes. He/she can just nominate his/her favourite members to the 
CDC and it would be perfectly in line with the CDF Act. “The unequal power relations 
between the MP and the community appear to have been institutionalized by the CDF 
Act”. (Gikonyo, 2008, quoted by Mungai)  
Spaces for citizens’ engagement 
According to the CDF Act, MPs “shall, within the first year of a new parliament and at 
least once every two years thereafter, convene meetings in the constituency to deliberate on 
development matters in the location, the constituency and the district’ (section 23(2)). 
Whether the community participates in the identification of projects depends on how the 
MP acts, who is invited to the meetings and who is not. The findings reveal that there is 
actually minimal involvement of the community. Most decisions related to project identi-
fication were made by those close to the MP and then passed as having been identified by 
the community.  
After the identification of projects, people and the organisations have a formal role in the 
process of prioritisation that takes place in the Constituency Development Committee, in 
which various seats are reserved for representatives of the community and for CSOs. 
Again, the MP chooses the partners. He/she decides which CSO can participate, and thus 
ensures that the members nominated to the CDC are those that will help advance his/her 
interests.  
Mungai found that the actions at the district level were limited. A District Projects Com-
mittee (DPC) has been put in place for harmonisation of the proposals coming from the 
constituencies. The DPC comprises mainly of technical departments of government who 
are to make sure that the projects submitted are in line with the government’s development 
priorities and that there is no duplication between projects being implemented under CDF 
and those being implemented by the line ministries. The DPC should assess if the costs 
allocated to the projects are realistic and look for co-financing opportunities with donors 
who may be interested in funding some of the projects implemented under CDF. It was 
reported by some of the technical departments that, in practice, CDCs did not forward 
projects to DPC for harmonisation and that there was minimal involvement of the 
technical departments at the district level. CSOs were playing no role at this level.  
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At the national level, the CDF Board decides about the projects submitted by the 210 
constituencies. The Board’s decisions are subject to approval by the Constituency Fund 
Committee (CFC) composed only of MPs. The Board has some formal slots for CSO 
representation.  
The picture that emerges is that, in spite of formal provisions in the CDF Act for people’s 
participation in the identification and decision making phases, the role of community mem-
bers and CSOs is more nominal than real. The CDF Act gives the community the right to 
identify the projects they consider necessary, but the space is severely limited for citizens as 
the MP chooses who participates in project identification and who becomes a member of 
the CDC. The opportunities for the engagement of citizens do not get any better during 
the implementation process of the projects. The day to day running of the projects is done 
by the Project Management Committees (PMCs) with the assistance of the relevant tech-
nical department as stipulated in the CDF Act. The CDC oversees the implementation, but, 
here again, the weight of people outside the sphere of influence of the MP is nil.  
Lack of information 
Apart from periodic internal audits by the CDF board and regular audits by the Kenya 
National Audit Office, no independent evaluation of CDF has been undertaken. It also 
appears that the kind of information being monitored in CDF is mainly financial informa-
tion. Writing a state-of-the-art paper about the CDF in Zambia, Alex Ngoma found an al-
most complete lack of information and documentation on the fund, which has been ongo-
ing in his country for almost 15 years. “… the Ministry of Local Government and Housing 
(MLGH) only had a copy of the December 2006 Guidelines despite being the ministry 
responsible for overseeing the administration of the CDF (-). The official of the MLGH in 
whose portfolio fell the CDF referred (-) to Cabinet Office (-). Cabinet Office simply had 
no information (-). Similarly, the library at Parliament had no information about the 
CDF.”(Ngoma, 2010) 
The role played by CSOs 
To open up the process for people’s participation, various CSOs have undertaken activities 
to inform communities about the Fund and to mobilise them to demand a bigger say in the 
project identification process. National and local NGOs worked together in producing 
information material and in conducting training workshops for the communities. It was 
believed that adequate access to information would make communities to put ‘pressure 
from below’, which might force the MPs to involve the community in decision making for 
fear that they may be voted out at the next general elections. “ 
Officially, the CDC is required to provide communities with information by announcing 
the selected projects and the financial allocations on public notice boards. This does not 
always happen. Faced with lack of information, two CSOs in Makueni and Machakos de-
cided to create a watchdog committee to oversee the implementation of projects. By col-
lecting information directly from the field, the committee checks if the contractors are on 
site doing the work, it keeps track of the materials being delivered and of the money being 
used. Also, the CSOs mobilize the community to write letters to the CDC and the MP of 
the area demanding proper information about the projects in their area. An action model 
applied by various CSOs is the so called ‘bunge la wananchi’, the citizens’ parliament, 
bringing together the area MP, the members of the CDC and the local community. The 
public forum gives the community the opportunity to question the officials about the CDF 
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projects, provided of course that they show up at the meeting which was often not the 
case. 
Some CSOs have set up a system to monitor the CDF projects. A CSO network at the 
national level with members across the country trained ‘grassroots monitors’ to follow and 
assess the implementation process. Information provided by these monitors is managed 
through a computer software programme, which makes it possible for the CSO network to 
keep track of projects across the country. Use is made of pictures taken at the project site 
to compare the actual status of the project with the formal reports of the CDC. In nineteen 
constituencies local monitors were trained to work with index cards, a source of informa-
tion for the public and an instrument to put pressure on the MP. The cards proved to be 
useful in identifying the ‘double-funding’ of projects, i.c. so-called CDF projects which had 
actually been realised with money from other sources.  
Performance by CSOs 
Mungai’s field research revealed limitations in the approach and capacity of CSOs to con-
duct the various activities around the CDF. Almost all CSOs in the region conduct aware-
ness raising activities with little or no collaboration amongst them. The result was a dupli-
cation of activities, waste of resources and conflicting messages going to the communities, 
which at times were overwhelmed with information and calls for action. One local CSO 
doing this work admitted it had not read the CDF Act and had not been trained on the 
content of the Act. It relied on what it heard from other CSOs. The audit work often 
seemed to be beyond the capacity of the organisations, which lack technical expertise to 
determine the quality of CDF projects, or research expertise to do proper sampling, data 
collection and analysis, or both. 
Conclusions 
The design of the CDF appears to have institutionalized unequal power relations between 
MPs and citizens, so that the Fund is far from being a participatory mechanism. Mungai 
concludes that “the political context within which CSOs operate constrains to a large 
extent the ability of CSOs to perform their roles. (-) A lot of power lies in the hands of the 
MPs who act as legislators, implementers and overseers of the CDF processes.” This has 
opened the door to “corruption, political patronage”.  
Given the unequal power relations in the ‘invited spaces’, civil society organisations were 
started to look for alternative ‘created spaces’ of engagement, from which they could 
undertake awareness raising and sensitisation campaigns to educate the community and to 
mobilize them to demand for more information and for more involvement in the CDF 
process. Research of the CDF projects and monitoring its implementation were also tasks 
that the CSOs had taken up to increase their influence. Mungai found they were not always 
very effective and efficient in doing that. She concludes that CSOs “tend to focus on their 
external environment (political interference) to explain the challenges confronting them 
while not paying particular attention to their internal challenges that directly constrain their 
effective engagement in CDF.” 
Critical concerns from elsewhere 
Critics from other countries have signalled the impossibilities of a CDF. Martin Henry, 
criticizing the CDF in Jamaica, wrote in The Gleaner: “”No breathing politician, an egoistic 
and corruptible human – not an angel from heaven – would fail to consider how to use the 
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resources at their disposal (-) to improve their chance of re-election.” Irenei Kiria of the 
Tanzania Policy Forum wondered in her article ‘Constituency Development Fund: Who 
decides?’ whose toy the fund actually is. “Have citizens been consulted?” She gives the 
answer: ”… we will implement the CDF because it has been done in Kenya and because 
the central government has decided to do so. I have not heard anybody saying the citizens 
decided.” Faced with plans to set up a CDF in Uganda, Nyakato Abooki wrote in The 
Monitor of August 20 2010: “The CDF can make a very big change in a lot of lives in this 
country, but it does not have to be channelled through the 400 MPs.” 
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